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Introduction
It is my pleasure to introduce to you the second
volume of the Gettysburg College Journal of the Civil War
Era. With support from our faculty advisors, this publication
had the unique opportunity to solicit papers from outside
institutions that dealt with topics concerning any facet of the
American Civil War. Although this opportunity is a great one,
it also caused the editorial board the added pressure of
selecting from a wide spectrum of expertly written
manuscripts. In working with the material for this volume, I
became increasingly aware and appreciative of the laudable
achievements of the members of this editorial board. These
students spent their Tuesday or Thursday evenings gathered
on the top floor of Weidensall Hall discussing and debating
the content of each submission received for publication. The
deliberations and comments made during our times spent
together truly demonstrated their competence.
Additionally, the papers selected for publication in
this volume are masterfully crafted. Shae Adams‟ Cultural
Distortion: The Dedication of the Thomas Stonewall Jackson
Monument at Manassas National Battlefield Park, explores
the memory of the American Civil War in the 1930s, as
reflected in the creation of one of the nation‟s most discussed
tributes to the Southern Confederacy. Our second article,
Loose Party Times: The Political Crisis of the 1850s in
Westchester County New York by Zachary Baum depicts the
political changes occurring in pre-Civil War society, not
among those living within large cities, but rather those
inhabiting a relatively small suburban area. In Evan Preston‟s
“All May Visit the Big Camp”: Race and the Lessons of the
Civil War at the 1913 Gettysburg Reunion, he explains the
lack of African Americans‟ attendance at the 1913
commemoration exercises in Gettysburg and the presence of a
strong white nationalist sentiment that fostered a sense of
reunion among the North and the South. And finally,
Katherine Titus depicts the major problems inherent in
Confederate government and society, especially concerning
the South‟s reevaluation of its traditional identity, in her
article, The Richmond Bread Riot of 1863: Class, Race, and
Gender in the Urban Confederacy.

4

Those of us connected with the Gettysburg College
Journal of the Civil War Era hope you enjoy our second,
Spring 2011 volume. We believe that our audience will find
these four pieces both enlightening and inspiring.
Rachel Santose
Gettysburg, Spring 2011
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Cultural Distortion: The Dedication of the Thomas
“Stonewall” Jackson Monument at Manassas National
Battlefield Park
Shae Adams
The Stonewall Jackson monument on Henry Hill at
the Manassas National Battlefield Park stands as a testament
to the propensity of Americans to manipulate history in order
to fit current circumstances. The monument reflects not the
views and ideologies of the veterans of the Civil War, but
rather the hopes and fears of those who spent the prime years
of their lives immersed in the Great Depression. Those of the
latter generation searched in vain for heroes among the
corrupted businessmen on Wall Street who ran the economic
affairs of the country, and who, in the eyes of the public,
plunged the nation into insurmountable debt. Historian
Lawrence Levine observed that fear served as a motivator for
1930s Americans as they struggled to feed their children
during the Great Depression. One reflection of this
overwhelming fear appeared in President Franklin Roosevelt‟s
1933 inaugural address as he insisted “the only thing we have
to fear is fear itself.”1 In order to cope with this stress,
Americans turned to a plethora of heroes as guiding lights for
the dark days of the Great Depression. Some turned to
gangster heroes like Bonnie and Clyde who undermined the
financial and legal systems by lashing out against the
institutions. Others devoured the serialized adventures of
Superman, a new kind of hero created by the sons of Jewish
immigrants in 1938.2 Still others turned to literature that
reminisced about other crises in American history, namely

1

Lawrence Levine, “American Culture and the Great
Depression,” Yale Review, no. 74 (1984-85): 200, 208. As
mentioned in Bradford W. Wright, Comic Book Nation: The
Transformation of Youth Culture in America (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 10.
2
Bradford W. Wright, Comic Book Nation: The
Transformation of Youth Culture in America (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 1, 7.
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Margaret Mitchell‟s Gone with the Wind, a bestseller in 1938.3
It was in this cultural setting that the Virginia State Legislature
conceived and financed the idea for a Stonewall Jackson
monument.
During the 1938 legislative session, the state of
Virginia appropriated $25,000 for the construction of a
monument to General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson on Henry
Hill at the newly created Manassas National Battlefield Park.
As of March 19, 1938, the day the federal government took
over the deed to the land, the property was bare of even a
visitor center that would not be constructed until two years
after the erection of the monument.4 5 The legislature charged
the Virginia Fine Arts Commission with finding a suitable
monument for the location. In response, the Commission sent
out a call for models for the Jackson monument. For the most
part, the Commission left the details of the sculpture to the
artist, naming only a handful of guidelines. One guideline
stipulated that the sculpture would include both Jackson and
his horse, Little Sorrell, cast in bronze. The other demanded
that “[t]he nature, quality, and significance of Stonewall
Jackson must be considered and expressed in the design of the
Monument.”6 After reviewing eighty entries, the Virginia Fine
Arts Commission announced the winner of the contest on
March 4, 1939. New York sculptor Joseph Pollia came with
the experience of sculpting Civil War era figures; he had
3

Levine, 223.
Memo to the Director, “Information Concerning Unveiling of
the Statue of Stonewall Jackson,” 12 July 1940, Stonewall
Jackson Monument Dedication Folder, Historian Files,
Manassas National Battlefield Park.
5
Joan M. Zenzen, Battling for Manassas: The Fifty- Year
Preservation Struggle at Manassas National Battlefield Park
(University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1998), 31.
6
Virginia Museum of Fine Arts, Richmond, Virginia,
“Prospectus—The Stonewall Jackson Monument Sculpture
Competition and Exhibition,” 29 October 1938, Stonewall
Jackson Monument Dedication Folder, Historian Files,
Manassas National Battlefield Park.
4
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created a monument to John Brown in North Elba and General
Philip Sheridan in New York, in 1935 and 1936, respectively. 7
The nature of the statue reflected not the General Jackson of
the Civil War, but rather the General Stonewall as seen
through the cultural eyes of the 1930s.
In Pollia‟s rendition, a Herculean Jackson sits tall
upon an equally muscular horse as he gazes out across Henry
Hill. He wears a cape that appears to be lifted by a dramatic
wind, lending itself to his heroic stance. The large lettering on
the base of the monument boldly declares, “There Stands
Jackson Like a Stone Wall,” referencing the words
purportedly spoken by General Barnard Bee at the Battle of
First Manassas, immortalizing Jackson with his nickname.
One of the largest monuments on Henry Hill, it commands the
attention of any visitor to the battlefield. 8 The Commission
proudly presented the model to the public on March 4, 1939,
after awarding Pollia the job.
However, they did not expect the virulent attacks
from Confederate organizations and the few remaining
Confederate veterans. These attacks began only a few days
after the announcement of Pollia‟s design. One veteran,
Colonel John Wesley Blizzard, grumbled that the statue made
the famed General appear to be sixty years old, despite the fact
that Jackson had died as a young man.9 Another veteran,
claiming to be the only remaining living veteran to see
Jackson and Lee at their last meeting on May 2, 1863, was
appalled at the depiction of Jackson‟s steed, Little Sorrell.
“That model makes the horse seem three times as big in front
as behind,” he remarked in disgust, “It looks more like a
buffalo.”10 Still other veterans complained that the depiction

7

"Joseph P. Pollia." New York Times (1923-Current file),
December 14, 1954.
8
As observed by the author on a visit to the park on
November 10, 2010.
9
AP, “Last Vet in Virginia‟s Confederate Soldiers‟ Home,
Sgt. Jack, Is Dead,” Miami News (Miami, FL), Jan. 28, 1941.
10
“Confederate Vets Don‟t Like Model of Jackson Statue.”
Free Lance-Star (Fredericksburg, VA), Mar. 23, 1939.

11

resembled General Grant rather than the Jackson. 11 Veterans
were not alone in voicing their concern. Confederate groups
like the Sons of Confederate Veterans and United Daughters
of the Confederacy united to protest what they considered a
monstrosity and an insult to the memory of Jackson. These
groups petitioned that the Arts Commission instead favor
sculptor F. William Sievers‟ model that depicted a humanly
proportioned Jackson astride a rather dejected but realistic
Little Sorrell. The cape, so despised by these Southern
organizations, was conspicuously missing in Sievers model. 12
The Commission refused to change its decision, although in
the hailstorm of protests, Pollia offered to make any changes
to his model the Commission deemed necessary.13
The choice of Pollia by the Arts Commission
reflected the mindset of 1930s Americans. Confederate groups
accused the Commission of selecting a “distorted conception”
of Jackson.14 In this instance, the Commission was guilty of
such accusations. Those on the panel chose a distorted image
of Jackson because they themselves had created a distorted
image of the American past in order to provide cultural succor
and guidance during the difficult years of the Great
Depression. Over the previous decade, Americans had created
a hollow mould for an idealized hero that desperately needed
filling; to the Arts Commission, the sentimentalized Jackson
of the Civil War could fill that mould. In the era when no
heroes seemed to exist, Americans looked to the past for
inspiration.15 The Civil War provided ample romantic figures
to ease this burden, despite the distortion of those figures. On
the one hand, Jackson symbolized the “spiritual strength”
many felt they had lost during the Depression.16 On the other,
he represented a rebel akin to the outlaw heroes Bonnie and
11

Virginius Dabney, “Statue Plans Irk Virginia,” New York
Times, Apr. 9, 1939.
12
“ „Battle of Manassas‟ Rages Again in Dixie,” Miami News,
Apr. 23, 1939.
13
Dabney.
14
“Confederate Vets Don‟t Like Model of Jackson Statue.”
15
Wright, 10.
16
Dabney.
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Clyde. Just like Bonnie and Clyde, Jackson had fought to
undermine a government institution he found corrupt and
against his state‟s prosperity. However, while Bonnie and
Clyde worked only for themselves, Jackson‟s memory stood
exalted on a pillar of self-sacrifice to country and freedom.
Interestingly, the statue itself bore several similarities
to the newly created and popularized Superman comic book
character. Jackson‟s abdominal muscles are comparable to
those of the Superman that appeared in Action Comic #1 in
1939. In addition, the heroic looking capes of both men appear
oddly similar in cut and dramatics. 17 These similarities point
to the need of Americans to see heroes of almost superhuman
status within their own past in order to create a cultural
mythos that could carry them through the weary drudgery of
unemployment and near starvation. Superman did not
represent the only embodiment of the physical exaggeration
conveying heroic status. Sculptures across the country,
including others created by Pollia, reflected the tendency of
Americans in the 1930s to idolize the physical strength of
cultural icons as the manifestation of moral heroism. For this
reason, Pollia may have seemed a socially relevant sculptor
for the Jackson monument. In the mid-1930s, Pollia sculpted a
number of monuments dedicated to American heroes, each
one exaggerating the physical muscularity of the depicted
figure. His 1935 statue of John Brown at North Elba, New
York creates the image of a figure whose physical robustness
reflects his spiritual strength.18 Two years later, Pollia erected
a monument to Admiral Robert E. Peary in Cresson,
Pennsylvania, depicting a well-defined explorer, his physical

17

Wright, 8.
West Virginia Archives and History, “His Soul Goes
Marching On: The Life and Legacy of John Brown: John
Brown in Print, Stage, Film, and Art,” West Virginia Division
of Culture and History,
http://www.wvculture.org/history/jbexhibit/playsandbooks.ht
ml (accessed December 8, 2010).
18
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prowess matching his courage in facing the arctic unknown.19
Pollia‟s monuments represented a trend paralleling other
movements in American popular culture during the 1930s.
Through the art and literature of this decade, the reshaping of
the American hero is apparent. Societies create heroes in order
to provide themselves with direction and meaning; some
cultures enshrine these heroes in stories for children, while
others create works of art to immortalize such individuals. In
the case of Virginia, they built a statue to a man whose image
they had distorted to give their tribulations meaning and hope.
Once the Commission decided upon the Pollia model,
the Park Service went to work planning the logistics that
accompanied its placement and dedication. Before the land
became a National Battlefield Park, the Henry Hill farm area
belonged to the Sons of Confederate Veterans. After the
United Daughters of the Confederacy, under the leadership of
Mrs. Westwood Hutchinson, gained an option to buy the
property at $25,000, the Sons of Confederate Veterans worked
out a deal with the Virginia state government that helped the
Sons purchase the land.20 The understanding between the two
entities was that after the purchase the Sons of Confederate
Veterans would pay for the upkeep of the park. 21 The original
purpose of the purchase was the creation of a Confederate
memorial park on the grounds. Once the land was purchased
in 1923, it was named the Manassas Battlefield Confederate
Park and those involved determined that it would be used for
educational purposes concerning the history and memory of
all Confederate soldiers. 22 However, the organization soon
found itself in financial straits that hindered the organization
19

As observed by Gettysburg Semester student, Dawn
Winkler-Pembridge in Cresson, Pennsylvania at Admiral
Peary Monument Park on November 28, 2010.
20
“Confederate News,” Confederate Veteran, no. 28, (October
1920): 397, as noted in Joan M. Zenzen, Battling for
Manassas: The Fifty- Year Preservation Struggle at Manassas
National Battlefield Park (University Park, Pennsylvania: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 217.
21
Zenzen, 15-6.
22
“Confederate News,” as footnoted in Zenzen, 217.
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from the barest upkeep of Henry Hill, let alone the erection of
monuments across the property. Instead of selling the land, the
Sons discussed the possibility of donating the land to the
federal government. After much debate and compromise, the
Sons voted to confer the land to the National Park Service,
demanding that the Park Service maintain a fair interpretation
of the battlefield once it passed into Federal hands. The deed
for the land passed into federal hands in March 1938, and once
the federal government shuffled, signed, and filed the proper
paperwork, the Manassas Battlefield Confederate Park became
the Manassas National Battlefield Park on May 10, 1940.23
The land did come with the stipulation that an
appropriate monument would occupy Henry Hill, and as a
result, the placement of the monument became a matter for the
National Park Service to decide. The Regional Director of the
Park Service insisted that the placement of the monument be
decided before selecting a location for the MuseumAdministration building.24 As a result, various Park officers
held a conference on April 27, 1940, to reconnoiter Henry Hill
for possible locations. They decided to erect the monument on
the hill in the location believed to have been held by Jackson
and his men on July 21, 1861. Those involved thereupon
decided that the Museum-Administration building would the
be constructed “in such relation to the monument that the
monument would become the focal point from the
observation-terrace.”25 This decision indicated a tremendous
shift in the memory and interpretation of the war. In the years
immediately following the war, Union veterans flatly denied
the requests of Confederate veterans to erect monuments upon
the fields on which they fought. At Gettysburg, for instance,
23

Zenzen, 24.
Memorandum for the Director, “Attention: Branch of Plans
and Design,” 5 April 1940, Stonewall Jackson Monument
Dedication Folder, Historians Files, Manassas National
Battlefield Park.
25
A.J. Ewald to Files, “Report on Conference Regarding
Location of Jackson Equestrian Statue,” 27 April 1940,
Stonewall Jackson Monument Dedication Folder, Historian‟s
Files, Manassas National Battlefield Park.
24
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the War Commission forced Confederate veterans to place
their memorials at their initial line of battle rather than at the
location of their military engagement with Federal troops. 26
That the National Park Service would allow a Confederate
memorial to stand on the field, but more importantly become
the focal point of the visitors center spoke to the reconciliatory
trend that marked war memory in the 1930s. In addition, the
use of the monument as a focal point marked its subject as the
key to the interpretation of the battle. This manner of exalting
Jackson by a federal body reflected the growing tendency of
the nation to accept Confederate symbols as national ones. As
the American people drew parallels between their own failures
of the 1930s and the failures of the defeated South, figures like
Jackson came to embody an American need for validation and
justification.
However, the circumstances surrounding the
placement of Confederate monuments on Henry Hill also
revealed the selective remembrance of the 1930s. In May of
1939, a year before the slated arrival of the Jackson
monument, a local chapter of the United Daughters of the
Confederacy raised one thousand dollars for the construction
of a memorial to General Barnard Bee on Henry Hill. The
memorial seemed fitting, dedicated to the man who gave
General Jackson his iconic moniker shortly before his own
death on the Manassas field. Like any other suggestion made
for the decoration of Henry Hill, the proposal caused
controversy. Assistant Research Technician for the Park,
Joseph Hanson, wrote to Superintendent Branch Spalding
complaining about the proposed Bee monument. He argued
that the location of the Bee monument, a mere one hundred
feet to the south of the Jackson monument, would crowd the
memorials.27 Despite Hanson‟s irritation with the prospect of

26

John P. Nicholson to The Secretary of War, “Monument
Location at Gettysburg,” Document 73, Box 13, Collections at
Gettysburg National Military Park.
27
Memorandum from Joseph Hanson to Coordinating
Superintendent Spalding: “Concerning Jackson Monument
and Proposed Bee Monument,” 8 May 1939, Stonewall
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two monuments on the hill, the United Daughters of the
Confederacy presented the small obelisk dedicated to Bee on
the field on July 21, 1939.28 That no fanfare accompanied the
presentation illustrated that while the Herculean Jackson
would capture all attention with a large dedication ceremony,
Bee would be effectively overshadowed by the grandeur of the
man he had a hand in creating. Just as few individuals read
into the possible sarcasm of Bee‟s famous words of “There
stands Jackson like a stonewall,” few would notice the smaller
monument in his honor.
Once the placement of the monument was decided,
the park embarked on the selective task of sending invitations
to those who would take part in the dedication ceremonies.
The Park designated a committee to organize the ceremonies
and all aspects related to the dedication. This committee made
the decisions concerning who would and would not merit an
invitation. While the dedication itself was open to the general
public, the committee awarded special groups throughout the
community individual invitations as a sign of respect. For
instance, the United Daughters of the Confederacy received a
private invitation to the unveiling ceremonies. The
organization of Confederate Veterans received an invitation as
well.29 In addition, several individual Confederate veterans
were invited as guests of honor: John Shaw, the oldest
Virginian Confederate veteran who had served as J.E.B
Stuart‟s runner during the war; John B. Cushing; J.A. Spicer;
and Colonel John W. Blizzard, who had served as General

Jackson Monument Dedication Folder, Historian Files,
Manassas National Battlefield Park.
28
Observed by the author on visit to the park on November
10, 2010.
29
Letter from Judge Walter L. Hopkins of Sons of
Confederate Veterans to Brach Spalding, Superintendent of
Battle Field Parks of Virginia, Fredericksburg, Virginia, “Lack
of Dedication Invitation,” 26 August 1940, Stonewall Jackson
Monument Dedication Folder, Historian Files, Manassas
National Battlefield Park.
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Jackson‟s runner during the war.30 Blizzard‟s invitation was of
particular interest, as he had criticized the statue shortly after
the Commission awarded Pollia the contract for the
memorial.31 The committee seemingly wanted to make peace
with the veterans who had expressed a dislike of the
monument while simultaneously honoring them for their
service. That the monument barely resembled the General
under whom the men had fought did not seem to concern the
committee. Their presence would symbolically provide the
connection to the past so desperately sought by Americans of
the Great Depression era. In a way, the presence of
Confederate veterans would validate the distortion of history
embodied in the Jackson statue. The choice of invitations
reflected the psychological needs of the committee and the
community as they sought to assure themselves of the parallels
between their own desperate economic situations and the
failed, but purportedly righteous, Confederacy.
On the other hand, organizations that did not receive
dedication invitations present an equally insightful look into
the values of the committee and the national mindset. Only
five days before the ceremony on August 31, 1940,
Superintendent Spalding received a terse letter from Judge
Walter L. Hopkins of the Sons of Confederate Veterans
demanding to know why the United Daughters of the
Confederacy and Confederate Veterans organizations received
invitations to the dedication while the Sons received nothing.
Hopkins sharply reminded Spalding that the Sons had bought
and donated the Henry Hill property to the United States
government, while the United Daughters had not “given one
cent” to the purchase of the property. 32 Spalding replied,
assuring Hopkins the lack of invitation indicated a mere
30

“2,000 See Jackson Statue Unveiled at Manassas Park,”
Richmond Times Dispatch, Sunday, September 1, 1940, as
contained in the Stonewall Jackson Folder, Historian‟s Files,
Manassas National Battlefield Park.
31
Miami News.
32
Letter from Judge Walter L. Hopkins Hopkins of Sons of
Confederate Veterans to Brach Spalding, Superintendent of
Battle Field Parks of Virginia, Fredericksburg, Virginia.
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oversight on the part of the committee. This alleged oversight
points to the tendency of Americans to forget the precise
events of the past while boldly forging a new future. By
forgetting to invite the very organization that provided the
funds for the land upon which the monument would stand, the
arrangement committee acted out the process of American
forgetfulness that in some ways created the very monument
being dedicated. The distortion of the Jackson image also
represented a forgetfulness of the details surrounding the new
national hero.
Other arrangements for the dedication included the
types of decorations allowed at the ceremony. Most
importantly, the committee requested permission to use the
Confederate flag as a drapery on the base of the statue during
the unveiling ceremonies. They argued that in other instances
the flag was employed as a decorative device and would be
appropriate at the Jackson monument dedication. Without
hesitation, the Park granted its permission.33 This assent led to
the wide use of the Confederate flag throughout the
ceremonies. Not only did the flag drape the statue‟s base, but
also the front of the speaker‟s podium. Multiple Confederate
flags decorated the rest of the stage, while two small American
flags waved atop the stage‟s portico.34 This blatant use of the
Confederate flag in a federally sponsored dedication ceremony
reflects the approval of Confederate symbolism within 1930s
society. The federal demand that all Confederate symbolism,
from regimental flags to buttons on uniforms, be relinquished
or blackened in the years immediately following the war faded
to be replaced by a societal acceptance of the symbols. Not
only were the symbols accepted, they were embraced in the
fervor to create meaningful and tangible connections to the
past. In 1865, a New York Times headline cried “The
33

Memorandum to the Director, “Use of Confederate Flag at
Dedication,” 8 August 1940, Stonewall Jackson Monument
Dedication Folder, Historian‟s File, Manassas National
Battlefield Park.
34
Photograph of Dedication Ceremony, Photographic
Stonewall Jackson Monument Dedication Folder, Historian‟s
File, Manassas National Battlefield Park.
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Confederate Flag Disappears from the Continent,” following
Kirby Smith‟s surrender.35 Only seventy-five years later, the
Stars and Bars served as the centerpiece for a federally
approved memorial honoring a fallen Confederate general.
That the Confederate flag flew alongside that of America adds
to the understanding of 20th century American society. By the
1930s, the Lost Cause worked its way into the national
memory of the war, creating a society that embraced the valor
of both sides and the righteousness of both Northern and
Southern convictions. The results of that societal shift
converged in 1940 at the dedication of the Manassas Jackson
monument as clearly seen through the simultaneous use of
Confederate and American flags.
After nearly three years of planning and fundraising,
the dedication ceremony took place on August 31, 1940, at
two in the afternoon, boasting nearly two thousand
observers.36 The program for the ceremony included the
unveiling of the monument by Miss Julia Preston, the greatgranddaughter of General Jackson, and Miss Ann Rust, the
daughter of Senator John A. Rust who sponsored the bill for
the Jackson statue. In addition, the Quantico Marine Band
played a rendition of “America”, while the Washington
Quartet and Band provided music as well. Famed historian,
Dr. Douglas Southall Freeman gave the keynote address of the
day.37 Each aspect of the program represented the cementation
of bonds between the past and the present, and the continued
distortion of Civil War history through Lost Cause memory.
The committee in charge of dedication arrangements
planned to honor the Jackson family by inviting Julia Preston
to unveil the statue of her great-grandfather during the
ceremonies. Fifty-three year old Preston provided a link
between the Confederate general and the 1930s American
35

"End of the Rebellion: The Last Rebel Army Disbands,”
New York Times (1857-1922), May 29, 1865.
36
“2,000 See Jackson Statue Unveiled at Manassas Park.”
37
Memorandum for the Coordinating Superintendent,
“Program for the Dedication of the Jackson Monument,” 28
August 1940, Stonewall Jackson Monument Dedication
Folder, Historian‟s Files, Manassas National Battlefield Park.
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public.38 Her presence symbolized a continuation of the ideals
of the Confederacy. Bloodlines tracing directly to the
Confederacy remained a point of pride throughout the South in
the years following the war, and became a point of interest
throughout the rest of the country during the Great
Depression. In some ways, the physical manifestations of
these bloodlines served to remind the nation that while the
Confederacy may have disappeared in 1865, its values and
ideologies persisted well into the 20th century. The existence
of descendants like Preston indicated that the past still
influenced and held meaning decades after the war.
While the role of Preston in the unveiling was selfexplanatory given her relationship to Jackson, the choice of
Ann Rust was slightly odd. Of course, her father, former State
Senator John A. Rust ensured that the statue would receive
state funding.39 However, other options existed in selecting the
second individual to unveil the monument. As previously
noted, four Confederate veterans attended the ceremonies, one
of whom served as a Jackson‟s runner. The participation of
one of these men would have illustrated a closer connection to
Jackson than Rust. Their participation would have fully forged
the bonds between the actual Confederacy‟s past in the form
of a veteran who had had with personal contact with Jackson,
and the idealized future of the Confederacy in the form of
Preston. By not selecting Blizzard to unveil the monument
with Preston, the committee further revealed the distortion of
history taking place within American society. Obviously, this
was not a monument for the veterans of the war as the
Commission dismissed their opinions during the creation of
the statue. Similarly, the ceremony did not seek to honor the
living veterans of the war. Jackson was no longer remembered
as a general who had traitorously fought against the federal
government; rather he was honored as a faithful soldier,
dedicated to the righteousness of his cause whose character
should be emulated by the current generation of American
38
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youth. By failing to offer Confederate veterans a role in the
dedication ceremony, the committee illustrated that while
Americans sought vindication and strength in the memory of
the Civil War‟s Confederate figures, they did not seek to tie
themselves to the facts of the war, but rather to the distorted
memory of the war. The veterans brought the crowd a little too
close to history, and while the desire to maintain a connection
to the past represents a key aspect of American society, so too
does the desire to separate oneself from the direct implications
of that history. Perhaps subconsciously, the committee
planning the dedication chose to keep the Confederate
veterans as mere spectators at the ceremony in order to avoid a
possible collision of perceptions concerning the realities of the
war.
In addition, the Quantico Marine Band played as part
of the dedication ceremony.40 The choice of this band in
particular indicated an accepted connection between the
federal government and the Confederate memory of the Civil
War. The band, created by legislation in 1918 to participate in
various events, “to improve morale, inspire, motivate, and
instill in the audiences, a sense of pride and patriotism, and to
re-affirm our core values, customs, and traditions, and best
represent the United States Marine Corps.”41 That a band
dedicated to promoting patriotism and American values would
play at a Confederate dedication is indicative of the meshing
of American and Confederate symbolism and values during
the 1930s. Their presence at the dedication revealed that
honoring the memory of Confederate generals served to
enforce dedication to the American nation, something the
Confederacy sought to destroy in 1861. Ironically, the band
played a rendition of “America,” a song that proudly
proclaims that America is a nation of freedom for all, a
freedom Confederates staunchly denied their African
40
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American slaves, a freedom granted by the North in the midst
of the war, and a freedom denounced by the ex-Confederates
following the war.42 That Jackson, a corps commander of the
Confederate army, would have been in favor of this display of
American patriotism seems unlikely.
The most anticipated moment of the program, aside
from the unveiling of the monument itself, came in the form of
historian Douglas Southall Freeman‟s keynote address at the
end of the ceremony. Freeman, president of the Southern
Historical Society, won renown as a Confederate historian in
1934 with the release of his four-volume book, R.E. Lee.43 The
historian carried a personal connection to the war. His father,
Walker Freeman, fought for the Confederacy in the Piedmont
Artillery and was present at Appomattox Court House on the
day of Lee‟s surrender.44 This connection to the war no doubt
influenced Freeman‟s views concerning the acts of both the
Confederacy and its generals. Steeped in the Lost Cause
tradition, Freeman created a widely endorsed view of the war
supported by scholarly research that seemed to validate the
Lost Cause, and the public‟s connection to the Civil War
South. By selecting Freeman as keynote speaker, the
committee further created a ceremony that would rely on the
distorted memory of the Civil War while maintaining a direct
connection to the war through Freeman‟s relationship to a
Confederate veteran.
Freeman did not disappoint. His address focused on
the growing fears of impending war as the United States
warily watched the increasingly ferocious fighting between the
British and the Germans. He offered a call to arms, relying
upon the image of Jackson as a national hero to admire and
emulate within the ranks of the armed forces as they prepared
for a potential war overseas. He emphasized the need for
Jackson‟s leadership style within the army, dependant on
“hard and stern discipline”. He praised Jackson as “one of the
42
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greatest soldiers of the Anglo-Saxon race,” who fought for
freedom and highly valued ideals throughout the great
American Civil War.45 Such praise of Jackson emphasizes his
status not as a traitor to the United States, but rather as a hero
dedicated to its traditions and highest morals.
Freeman went on to urge the American people to take
strength in the prayer of past Americans embattled by war: “
„let God defend the right.‟”46 The words seem out of place at a
memorial service devoted to those who lost their struggle, and
in the antebellum tradition, lacked the righteous cause.
However, Freeman was working from within a philosophical
construct resulting from the South‟s loss of the Civil War.
Following the war, the Lost Cause provided vindication for
the South as they comforted themselves with the belief that
sometimes righteous causes face defeat not because of an
inherent wrong in the cause itself, but because at times God
chooses to test the faithful and just through defeat. Thus, exConfederates warmed themselves from the biting winds of
defeat by wrapping the mantle of Job around themselves and
their loss. With the crash of the stock market in 1929 and the
following Depression, Americans searched for a reason for the
suffering of morally upstanding individuals, finding their
answer preconceived in the Lost Cause ideology. 47 Freeman,
aware of the shifting notions concerning the Confederacy,
encouraged the direction of Civil War interpretation
illustrating to Americans that Confederate ideals need not only
serve in times of economic strain, but in times of war as well.
Freeman promised that Americans could find fortification and
succor in the examples of valor and devotion “so beautifully
exemplified in the life and service of Stonewall Jackson.” 48 A
few days after his address, Assisting Park Directory, A.E.
Demaray, wrote to Freeman praising his address as being,
“replete with meaning and significance for the American
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people at this time.”49 The dedication ceremony as a whole,
and specifically Freeman‟s address, reflected the state of the
American historical worldview as the 1940s opened.
However, not all agreed with the entirety of the
monument following its dedication celebration. An editorial
piece in a local journal condemned the monument for its
plaque containing the names of the various politicians who
sponsored the Jackson monument legislation. The writer
insisted that Jackson, as a “hero of the past” deserved a
memorial of his own without added political weight.50 The
incensed writer reveals more than merely his own belief in the
proper memorialization of Jackson. He illustrates the
emotional devotion Americans adopted toward Confederate
figures throughout the course of the Great Depression. As
Thomas Connelly notes in his study of the image of Robert E.
Lee, Americans developed strong attachments to figures like
Robert E. Lee who appeared to embody enviable dignity in the
face of humiliating loss.51 While Jackson did not reach the
same pinnacle of hero memorialization as Lee in the years of
the Great Depression, his memory gained a new life during the
decade. The erection of the Jackson monument on Henry Hill
and the emotions surrounding its creation stand as a testament
to that distorted revitalization of the Confederate general.
Every era looks to those that came before for
guidance. As time progresses the memories of the actions of
previous generations reshape to take on new meaning to fit the
situational needs of the current generation. For Americans,
this phenomenon holds a particular truth in the case of the
Civil War. The meanings of the war changed during the war
itself, and in each subsequent generation. At times the reunion
of a nation seemed at stake, while at others a national identity
49
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arose from the ashes of Richmond. The 1930s heralded yet
another new interpretation of the war. That generation relied
on the romantic, larger than life heroism of the war memory in
order to fill the nation with assurance of righteousness and
brighter days ahead. The Jackson monument stands as a
culmination of that reliance. Jackson himself illustrates a
connection to various aspects of American cultural life,
making him a relevant figure to that moment in time. His
attempt to change the workings of the federal government by
revolting outside of its institutions paralleled the escapades of
Bonnie and Clyde; his image as a superhuman hero to rise
above the common man and protect the country connected to
the introduction of new superheroes like Superman; the
romance of the war and men like Jackson played itself out in
the popularity of Gone with the Wind. The monument and its
dedication at Manassas provided a look not at Civil War
society, but Great Depression society. Those involved in its
creation and dedication illustrated their commitment to a
distorted historical memory in a myriad of ways. The Jackson
of Manassas stands not as a monument to the man, but to the
generation that clung to his image for reassurance in times of
national uncertainty.
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Loose Party Times: The Political Crisis of the 1850s in
Westchester County, New York
Zachary Baum
On November 7, 1848 William H. Robertson rose
early and rushed to the post office in Bedford, a town in
Westchester County, New York. The young lawyer was
brimming with excitement because two weeks earlier, the
Whigs in the county‟s northern section had nominated him as
their candidate for the New York State Assembly. Only
twenty-four years old and a rising legal star, Robertson hoped
that holding political office would launch his nascent career.
After casting his ballot at the Bedford Post Office, Robertson
paid a visit to Sheriff James M. Bates, his political manager, to
await the election results. Robertson‟s intelligence, collected
a week before Election Day, that “news from every part of the
district is favorable,” proved accurate. The Whig attorney
heard later that evening that he had defeated his Democratic
opponent, with 57% of the vote. To celebrate, Robertson and
Bates feasted on “chickens, turkeys, oysters, and Champaign”
before retiring around midnight at Philer Betts‟ Hotel. The
following afternoon, they boarded the 3:00 PM train from
Bedford to the county seat of White Plains, seventeen miles
south. There, the two triumphant Whigs gossiped and caught
up with their counterparts from Westchester‟s usually
Democratic southern section. Hearing of their friends‟
overwhelming victories surprised Robertson, leading him to
exclaim, “The Whigs have carried almost everything!”
Indeed, the Whigs had swept every elective office in
Westchester County.52
The demise of Robertson‟s party a few years later
marked the end of America‟s Second Party System,
characterized by Whig-Democratic competition between 1824
1

William Robertson, “Diary of Judge William H. Robertson,”
Vol. 3, Oct. 31 (first quotation), Nov. 7 (second quotation), 8
(third quotation), 1848, Westchester County Historical
Society, Elmsford, NY. Robertson received with 2,246 votes
(57%). For election results, see Westchester Herald, “Official
Canvass,” Nov. 24, 1848.

27

and 1860. Scholars have extensively chronicled how and why
this system rose and fell. Yet historians have overlooked one
important area of the American political landscape: the suburb.
Despite the recent popularity of suburbs as a subject of
twentieth century history, few historians have studied politics
in nineteenth century American suburbs. The most complete
scholarly account of the county‟s history, a 1982 Ph.D
dissertation, is a genealogical study that includes only scant
analysis of voting behavior, political ideology, and party
formation. One political scientist‟s observation, over eighty
years ago, that Westchester County was “the unexplored…area
of American politics,” remains true to this day. Mapping the
collapse of the Second Party System in what is perhaps the
most famous suburb in America sheds light on how the
development of new communities in 1850s New York
enflamed political controversies and why the parties of Andrew
Jackson‟s era became extinct.53
Historians continue to debate the causes of this
political realignment. One prominent thesis is that the
Democrats and Whigs disintegrated because the slavery
extension issue fractured the American electorate along
sectional instead of party lines. Another group of historians
defend the so-called ethno-cultural interpretation, which posits
that nativism, temperance, and religious conflict were the
primary culprits in the death of the Second Party System.
Though Westchesterites, like most other Americans, cared
about slavery extension, it was primarily local ethno-cultural
53
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issues that motivated voters to abandon their old parties in
response to the political crises of the early 1850s. But as the
Third Party System took form in the late 1850s, it was slavery
that gave the Democrats and Republicans shape and
substance.54
Westchester is a revealing case study of the Second
Party System because the county enjoyed robust commercial
ties to New York City, the financial capital of the United States
and a central political battleground during the transition to the
Third Party System. The journey from the county seat of White
Plains to the southern tip of Manhattan, the largest market in
the U.S., was only thirty-five miles. With the exception of
New York and Kings Counties, Westchester had the largest
merchant population in the state in the 1850s. As a county that
was only beginning to transition from rural to suburban,
however, the most common occupation for Westchesterites at
the start of that decade remained farming. Though the county
contained only an average population of farmers, the aggregate
value of Westchester‟s farmland in 1850 was the sixth highest
of any county in the United States, and exceeded that of six
entire states. By the end of the decade, Westchester‟s farmland
had appreciated to become the third most valuable of any
county nationally. As the 1850s dawned, the county was a
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commercial and agricultural powerhouse in both state and
nation.55
These developments turned the county into an
appealing place to call home. Westchester‟s population grew
by 70% during the 1850s, raising it from the forty-third most
populous county in the United States in 1850 to twenty-first
most populous in 1860. Much of this growth was concentrated
in the three towns adjacent to New York City in what is today
the Bronx. One satisfied commuter from Morrisania observed
that by 1850, southern Westchester was a desirable “location as
a place of residence, for persons doing business in the city,
being so easy of access” to midtown and lower Manhattan.
Even twenty miles to the north, a White Plains editor
complained in 1853 that as a result of Westchester‟s
attractiveness to disgruntled New Yorkers, “the city is pouring
out an unbroken tide of population into our midst.” 56
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Political parties struggled to adapt to Westchester‟s
changing demography over the course of the 1850s. Local
Whigs and Democrats were largely unable to address the new
issues that arose during this turbulent decade. The new
suburbanites were typically affluent Protestants who brought
their anti-Catholic and pro-temperance proclivities with them,
which inextricably altered Westchester‟s political landscape.
Though the Democratic Party remained dominant in
Westchester throughout the 1850s, this new constituency gave
rise to political conflicts that determined election results,
destroyed the Whig Party, divided the Democrats, gave rise to
third parties, and reflected national sentiment on a variety of
salient issues. The major parties‟ failure to address important
policy issues of the early 1850s led the editor of Westchester‟s
most popular Democratic newspaper, the Eastern State
Journal, to observe that “we are indeed upon „loose party
times.‟” But that same editor correctly predicted three years
later, “out of this chaos, [new] parties will take form and
shape.” This chaos engulfed Westchester County, creating
unusual political coalitions and realignments at all levels of
government.57
Perhaps the most notable theme that permeated
Westchester‟s politics during the early 1850s was antipartyism.
This sentiment flourished across the county, but was especially
strong in the southern section that had absorbed most of the
well-to-do migrants from New York City. Cogswell and Hyde
refused to endorse a party ticket during the 1850 national and
state contests, instead instructing southern Westchesterites to
vote “without distinction of party” for a “Union Ticket”
consisting mostly of Democrats and a few Whigs. Even ten
years prior to the Civil War, suburbanites generally felt a
stronger allegiance to country than to party and expressed a
willingness to shed their party ties for the sake of Union. In the
aftermath of the 1850 elections, predicted these editors, “new
parties will be formed, or…the two great parties of this day will
be reorganized.” In the new villages adjacent to the City,
“party spirit has not yet been allowed to interfere with local
affairs…it is no matter whether a Judge, assessor, tax-gatherer,
57
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Constable, &c. be Whig or Democrat,” declared the Gazette’s
editors, in 1851. In advance of the April local elections,
Cogswell and Hyde supported candidates “without reference
to…party politics” and encouraged their readers to “break loose
from party trammels, and act an independent party.” The
electoral districts that bordered the City supported a so-called
“Regular Dem. Whig” ticket that included a Democrat as town
supervisor of West Farms and a Whig as town supervisor of
Westchester. Though these two candidates were of different
parties, they both won handily in nearly identical districts with
similar constituencies. The electorate‟s weariness of party
labels revealed that the new residents of Westchester County
had weak local political allegiances years before the slaveryextension crisis challenged the major national parties. 58
Divisions within the parties posed just as much a
threat to the Second Party System as did antipartyism. At the
1850 New York convention in Syracuse, for example, state and
county Whigs divided into two groups: the Silver Grays and the
Sewardites. Silver Grays represented the party‟s conservative
members, also known as Cotton Whigs, who bolted when the
convention delegates incorporated into their platform William
H. Seward‟s anti-slavery policies. This faction derived its name
from the silver-white hair of Frances Granger, one of the
leaders of the bolting faction. Also led by Millard Fillmore,
Silver Grays favored a conciliatory approach to southern
slaveholders, strong temperance laws, and restricting
immigrants and Catholics from civic life. Sewardites, known
pejoratively as “Woolly Heads,” were “Conscience Whigs”
58
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who opposed the Compromise of 1850, favored restricting the
spread of slavery, and were generally indifferent toward
foreign influence in domestic politics. This faction derived its
name from a prevalent racial slur against blacks because of the
faction‟s anti-slavery political views. Though Sewardites
dominated statewide, the county was evenly split between them
and Silver Grays: each Whig faction had a paper in the county
and half of Westchester‟s delegates joined Granger‟s protest.59
These factions developed in the county along sectional
lines. The Whiggish northern area contained commercial
farmers, businessmen, and industrial interests who embraced
the political views of Seward, Horace Greeley, and Thurlow
Weed. The southern section contained ex-New Yorkers who
hated Catholics, enjoyed commercial relationships with
southern planters, and were generally evangelicals. In addition,
clusters of French Huguenot refugees had long inhabited the
southern Westchester communities of Pelham and New
Rochelle, forming another crucible in which anti-Catholic
sentiment flourished. Though the Silver Grays and Sewardites
were ideologically opposed on slavery, when it came to local
affairs, said a Democratic editor, they “lovingly embrace each
other, and…make no distinctions between their own candidates
of whatever faction.” In the early 1850s, faction leaders horsetraded by splitting local nominations. But as nativism and
slavery destroyed their national and state parties, Westchester
Whigs followed their factional leaders into new political parties
that upended the local and national party systems.60
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Divisions within the Democratic Party also influenced
party realignments, though these factional disputes were fueled
by slavery and financial policy. The more radical faction,
called the Barnburners, favored the Wilmot Proviso to exclude
slavery from all new western territories and opposed expanding
the public debt to finance the Erie Canal. This faction derived
its name from a farmer who burned down his barn to drive out
rats. In New York, Barnburners were willing to destroy public
works and the banks that funded them to root out waste and
fraud. Led by Martin Van Buren, the Barnburners bolted from
the Democratic Party in the 1848 presidential election to
support the Free Soil Party—a coalition of Barnburner
Democrats, abolitionists, and supporters of Henry Clay who
fled the Whigs after they nominated Zachary Taylor for
President. The conservatives, known as Hunkers, opposed the
Wilmot Proviso, supported reconciliation with their southern
slaveholding counterparts, and supported the Whig policy of
borrowing money to pay for canal improvements. Members of
this faction were loyal to William L. Marcy, an ex-governor,
senator, and cabinet secretary, and derived their name by
“hunkering” after the spoils of office. Westchester sent a
Hunker, Benjamin Brandreth, to Albany as state senator while
the Democratic Party was split in two.61
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Mixed reaction to the Compromise of 1850 within and
between the major parties foreshadowed party fragmentation
and realignment. The parties were in the midst of such a crisis
that a month after the Compromise passed, the Democratic
press predicted, in November 1850, that “the two old
parties…will entirely break up before the next Presidential
election” in 1852. Sutherland‟s prediction was incorrect, but
his forecast had some convincing evidence: a Silver Gray Whig
President had signed the legislation, which passed Congress
with the support of Democrats whose views aligned with the
Hunkers; Sewardite Whigs and Free Soil Democrats opposed
the bills. The unusual coalitions that supported and opposed
the Compromise nationally also existed in Westchester. The
Silver Gray and Hunker presses predictably observed that “all
party feelings and party politics seemed merged” after a
meeting of pro-Compromise Westchesterites passed a set of
bipartisan resolutions supporting the controversial Fugitive
Slave Law but repudiating secession. The Sewardites, of
course, decried the Law as “inhuman and revolting,” criticizing
the Compromise for “forcing us back into bondage and
servitude.” Westchester‟s leading Barnburner editor, of course,
also considered this piece of the Omnibus Bill “a most gross
usurpation of power by Congress; a plan, palpable violation of
the Constitution.” Party affiliation, then, was not a reliable
indicator of a voter‟s views on slavery: Hunker Democrats and
Silver Gray Whigs favored compromise with the South,
whereas Barnburner Democrats and Woolly Head Whigs
sought to restrict slavery‟s spread. The evaporation of
differences between local parties when it came to national
policy had grave consequences for the Second American Party
system. “Consensus, not conflict,” according to one historian,
destroyed the Jacksonian parties. Without clear differences
between Whig and Democratic policies, voters shed their old
political affiliations.62
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The other major source of disagreement between the
Barnburner and Hunker Democrats, and Silver Grays and
Sewardite Whigs, concerned how to finance Erie Canal
improvements. In the age of Andrew Jackson, the parties split
cleanly on this issue: Democrats resisted government
sponsorship of internal improvements, whereas Whigs favored
them. But according to one historian, in the 1850 and 1851
statewide contests the canal question surpassed even slavery as
a divisive force in the extant party system. The unusual
alignment of the parties on this question, with the conservative
factions proposing to use projected toll revenues as collateral
for a loan and the radical factions proposing a direct tax on
canal shipments, confirmed Sutherland‟s view that “the Canal
question is…above party.” Westchester became embroiled in
this controversy when its state senator, Hunker Benjamin
Brandreth, broke with the state party over canal funding. After
Whigs forced a vote on a bill to borrow $9 million to finance
improvements, twelve Democratic senators walked out of the
chamber. The state senate became paralyzed as it lacked the
necessary three-fifths attendance required for a quorum.
Though Brandreth did not support the bill, he was one of two
Democratic senators who remained in the chamber to vote nay.
“It appeared to me contrary to the spirit of Republicanism,”
Brandreth observed in October 1851, to block a vote. Few
Westchester Democrats supported Brandreth‟s decision, or
shared his fear that the bolters would further weaken their
already divided party at the polls.63
This clash between Brandreth and his party leadership
reflected how local concerns accelerated the crumbling of the
Second Party System. Westchester‟s Barnburner press, which
opposed Brandreth because he was a Hunker, “wanted no new
63
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issue….the party would probably be better off if the contending
leaders of both the late sections of the party were overthrown.”
The Hunker press, which generally supported the senator,
endorsed the bolting senators and correctly pointed out that
“the Democracy do not appear to be united in this
movement…with such disunion in the Democratic ranks,” there
was no such thing as a “majority opinion of the Democracy of
this county.” Brandreth‟s decision to buck the state party
reveals that even the most prominent Westchester politician
shared his constituents‟ antiparty sentiment. Brandreth paid a
steep cost for contravening his leadership: the party denied him
re-nomination in 1851, and he was trounced at the polls
running as an independent candidate. The near unanimous
condemnation of the bolting Democrats, coupled with editors‟
rhetorical support for ousting party leaders, would remain a
driving force behind the demise of the Second Party System in
Westchester.64
If political affiliation did not reflect voters‟ views on
extending slavery and expanding the Erie Canal, party ties were
an even more unlikely indicator of Westchester politicians‟
views on temperance. Former Whigs in Cortlandt, a town on
the county‟s northern border, believed that curtailing
drunkenness represented “a crisis in which the principles of the
two leading parties are not involved.” These temperance
advocates encouraged fellow Westchesterites, during the local
elections in spring 1851, to support an independent slate of
anti-liquor politicians “without reference to creed or party.”
The temperance ticket posed such a threat to the major parties
that Thomas A. Whitney, the Democratic candidate for
Cortlandt Town Supervisor, withdrew two weeks before the
race and supported his Whig opponent. Most of these local
contests in the twenty-two municipalities across the county,
according to Sutherland, were “waged on other than party
grounds…the issue was rum or no rum.” The orientation of
Westchester‟s electorate as either pro-temperance or antitemperance, instead of Democratic or Whig, indicated that the
64
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process of party realignment was not solely connected to
national debates about slavery. Rather, the breaking up of the
Second Party System was deeply rooted in local affairs that
affected daily life, and was catalyzed when the two major
parties failed to address ethno-cultural issues plaguing northern
communities. According to a Hunker editor, Westchester voted
“without regard to strict party lines” in 1851.65
In the southern section of the county as well, the
prevalence of ethno-cultural issues led commuters to drift from
their old parties. During the 1852 election, hundreds of West
Farms Protestants coalesced around an antiparty prohibitionist
ticket. Though this slate was narrowly defeated, the Eastern
State Journal observed, “the contest was not a party one; it was
between the…Maine Liquor Law [Temperance] advocates on
the one side and the opponents of the Law on the other.” Many
of these commuters, like their northern counterparts, held
stronger allegiances to the temperance movement than they did
to political parties. “It is a glorious thing that party ties begin
to hang loosely on the people, and that considerations other
than party interests are beginning to…call out the votes of our
citizens,” reported an anonymous temperance advocate in the
Peekskill Republican. He wanted elected officials to close
taverns on Sundays, create strict requirements for obtaining a
liquor license, and require any establishment that served
alcohol to also provide housing. Neither the Democrats nor the
Whigs incorporated these demands into their platforms, causing
many voters to flee from their ranks, weakening their own
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electoral strength, and foreshadowing the rise of new parties
that did address issues about which commuters cared.66
The salience of the temperance issue, and the Whigs‟
inability to address it, accelerated the party‟s disintegration. In
the 1852 election, the Westchester County Temperance
Alliance held a convention to nominate candidates for
statewide office. The first ballot for state assemblyman of the
county‟s northern district was evenly divided between John
Collett, a Whig, and George Mason, a Democrat. Collett
ultimately won the Alliance nomination and spoiled the
election for the Whig candidate: though the Whigs typically
won this seat comfortably, they lost to the Democrats by 39
votes out of 4,266. “If the Whigs had nominated a Maine Law
Candidate in this District…he would have been elected,”
lamented J.J. Chambers, the Sewardite editor of the Peekskill
Republican, a few days after the election. Comparing the split
between the Whig and Temperance Parties to “a big Railroad
accident,” a Silver Gray likewise observed in the Hudson River
Chronicle that Whigs who defected to the Alliance “find
themselves and the Temperance cause crushed…[Collett] will
feel that he has injured his own party.” By 1852, temperance
movements had siphoned thousands of voters from the Whig
Party, which was well on its way to extinction.67
The debate over temperance intensified in the spring
of 1853 when Democratic Governor Horatio Seymour vetoed a
prohibitory liquor law. In response, the antiparty County
Temperance Alliance passed resolutions to consider
nominating any Democrat or Whig for state office who
supported the Maine Law. Though Horace Greeley was the
group‟s choice for state senate, he declined the nomination.
The convention instead selected William Robertson, the Whig
attorney from Bedford, as their candidate. Robertson‟s original
party was still reeling from its 1852 defeat, and so to avoid past
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mistakes, the Whigs also nominated him. Perhaps party leaders
were swayed to support the temperance candidate upon hearing
Samuel Wood, a powerful Alliance organizer, declare that “it
were better…that existing political parties were annihilated,
than that the evils [of liquor] we complain of should be
perpetuated.” County Whigs had no choice but to take Wood
seriously and cooperate with his anti-liquor party. This
marriage proved fruitful: on Election Day, the fusion ticket
picked up both a state senate seat and an assembly seat from
the Democrats. Reflecting on the temperance organization‟s
recent victory, one of Wood‟s colleagues, D.D. McLaughlin,
boasted that they “held the balance of power, and could thus by
firm and united action control any election.” Westchester
Whigs‟ experience with the temperance movement was a
microcosm of a national trend that intensified in 1853 and left
their party feeble and fragmented. Across the north and midAtlantic, voters expressed anti-liquor sentiment not through
their traditional parties, but through state and local temperance
organizations. By contributing to the destruction of the Whig
Party, the Maine Law movement turned the 1850s into an era
of realignment.68
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Westchester‟s Democratic Party pounced on the
fusion of Whigs and the Temperance Alliance in a desperate
attempt to woo anti-liquor Democrats back into the party‟s
fold. Attrition from the Democrats began in 1852 when
temperance forces came close to installing one of their own as
Democratic candidate for state assembly in Westchester‟s
northern district. With the prohibitionist threat to Democratic
Party strength fresh in mind, the Eastern State Journal noted
the “divided and confused condition of the Democratic party on
the one side, and the rotten, crumbling state of the Whig party
on the other, together with the „loose party times‟ prevalent in
every quarter” of the county. These three phenomena,
continued the editorial, “gave to the Maine Law organization,
or „Alliance,‟ a potency and effectiveness at the [1853] election
just passed, which no clear-sighted sagacious politician could
have failed to foresee.” The county‟s other Democratic paper,
the Westchester Herald, endorsed the Maine Law a month
before that election. Ambivalent Democrats now had political
cover to vote the Temperance ticket, confirming the Eastern
State Journal’s fears. By providing a political vehicle for antiliquor advocates, the temperance party enticed voters to
abandon the Democrats, and, of course, the Whigs. Flight from
the major parties, in turn, led to the unraveling of the
institutions that sustained the Second Party System.69
As the relative stability ushered in by the Compromise
of 1850 gave way to turbulence by the end of the 1853, yet
another split emerged in the Democratic Party that facilitated
political realignment. Many Barnburners found themselves
without a major party affiliation after the disappearance of the
anti-slavery Free Soil Party in 1849. Westchester Hunkers,
however, needed Barnburner votes in advance of the 1852
Presidential contest. But many Hunkers believed so strongly in
supporting Southern slavery policy that they refused to
reconcile their differences with the Barnburners. This dispute
cut a deep divide within the Hunker camp between Softs, who
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would welcome Barnburner bolters back into the party, and the
Hards, who would penalize them. In 1853, Westchester
Democrats generally supported the Hards because Softs in
Albany had temporarily fused with the Whigs in support of
temperance candidates. A week after this unusual coalition of
Softs and Whigs won a few state and local offices, the county‟s
Hard press decried “these traitors to the cause of Democracy,”
who “have led off a portion of the honest masses from us, and
defeated our candidates.” Stung losing by an important state
senate seat, Westchester‟s leading Barnburner, Edmund
Sutherland, attributed his party‟s 1853 statewide defeat to “the
Temperance Alliance…but Free Soil treachery and bolting did
more.” The division between the Hards and Softs continued to
plague Westchester Democrats throughout the mid-1850s,
ultimately contributing to the party‟s only two electoral losses
in the county during that decade.70
The tumult of 1853 intensified the following year
when Stephen Douglas‟s Kansas-Nebraska Act pushed slavery
to the forefront of national, state, and local politics. In
Westchester, both Democrats and Whigs sought to exploit antiNebraska sentiment to win elections. The Sewardite press
made the most vocal appeal to anti-slavery advocates by
decrying the bill‟s passage as “the darkest day in the Senate”
and promising “political death to every man who lifted his hand
or voice in favor of slavery.” The largest of many antiNebraska meetings in the county took place at the White Plains
Courthouse in August 1854, and featured speeches by
politicians from both parties. The county‟s Barnburner organ,
the Eastern State Journal, also commended Westchester‟s
Democratic Congressman, Jared V. Peck, for voting against the
Kansas-Nebraska Act. Sewardites and Barnburners united in
opposition. Westchester‟s Hards, however, split. Most
prominent among them, State Senator Benjamin Brandreth
encouraged his supporters to remain “true to [their] northern
instincts and experience” by opposing the Kansas-Nebraska
70
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Act. But Caleb Roscoe, the editor of the Westchester Herald,
supported Douglas‟s bill because it established the doctrine of
popular sovereignty, or local referenda on whether or not to
permit slavery in the territories. Despite this minor division
within an already factionalized Democratic Party, anti-slavery
sentiment generally united Westchesterites. Whereas reaction
to the Compromise of 1850 was mixed, reaction to the KansasNebraska Act was nearly unanimous. So although slavery
became a salient national issue, fault lines between the local
parties formed based on ethno-cultural distinctions. In the
1854 contest, nativism and temperance did more than slavery to
upend Westchester‟s party system. 71
Across the North, voters expressed nativist sentiment
through a third party called the Know-Nothings. The rank-andfile often belonged to secret fraternal lodges affiliated with the
Order of United Americans (O.U.A.) or the Order of the Star
Spangled Banner (O.S.S.B). According to a county KnowNothing, these lodges consisted mostly of former Hunkers and
Silver Grays, who coalesced around a conservative political
agenda of prohibiting alcohol, creating tough naturalization
laws, and limiting Catholic influence in public institutions. In
the southern towns of West Farms, Pelham, and Westchester,
anti-Catholic, anti-liquor, and antiparty sentiment had
flourished since at least 1850, providing a rich pool of voters
for the Know-Nothings. “They seem, down in the lower part of
the County, to deal in Native Americanism,” charged a
Peekskill Whig who lived on Westchester‟s northern border.
This sentiment was, in reality, ubiquitous in the anti-Catholic
and temperance enclaves along Westchester‟s New York City
border. Commuters who fled the City, in part to avoid Irish
immigrants, found a home in the Know-Nothing Party.
Likewise, the Huguenot Protestants, who fled persecution from
a French Catholic monarchy to settle in Pelham and New
71
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Rochelle, also flocked to the Know-Nothings. Many voters in
West Farms, according to a Peekskill Republican correspondent
feared the “foreign and antagonistic population” a few miles
south, whose “noisy and riotous proceedings” disturbed
otherwise tranquil country lives. By providing a vehicle to
elevate the ethno-cultural issues that neither the Democrats nor
the Whigs adequately addressed, the Know-Nothings weakened
these two factionalized parties and dominated Westchester
politics in 1854 and 1855.72
Though Know-Nothingism thrived in Westchester,
some lodges suffered from factional rivalries. These divisions
stemmed primarily from previous party affiliations and
prevented the Order from establishing itself as a potent political
force as the Third Party System took form. “I have tried for the
last six or eight meetings to procure an acceptance and
indorsement of this ticket,” complained an Ossining KnowNothing to party leader and 1854 gubernatorial candidate
Daniel Ullmann. A week before the election, Know-Nothing
cohesion appeared to be unraveling in that town because “two
thirds of this council will vote directly for Seymour, and the
Whig members insist that a State nomination by our Order is
intended to entice the Whig members to throw away their votes
on our nominee.” This worst-case scenario became a reality
when Ullmann was routed in Ossining, with the Soft candidate
and the Whig candidate receiving a combined 80% of the vote.
An Ossining Democrat mocked this lodge, in an Eastern State
Journal column, as being “led by a set of old party hacks and
broken down politicians who have managed to crawl into their
Order.” Alexander H. Wells, the leader of O.S.S.B Chapter
#72 in Ossining, conceded that his fellow nativists would most
72
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likely vote “with their previous party predilections.” Though
his concern proved valid for his lodge, most others around the
county supported Ullmann. O.S.S B members shed their old
party ties and united with previous political rivals to vote the
Know-Nothing ticket in the fall of 1854. J.P. Sanders, a
Peekskill Know-Nothing who assured Ullmann that
“everything is smooth in this section,” better measured the
Westchester electorate‟s pulse than did his Ossining
counterpart.73
Both parties feared the Order as the 1854 elections
approached. “Every vote given to Ullmann [Know-Nothing]
will be taken from Clark [Whig] and practically given to
Seymour [Democrat], the Rum candidate and advocate of
slavery propagandism. Why then should any Whig or
Temperance man…worse than waste his vote, by casting it for
this altogether useless nomination?” inquired the county‟s
Whig organ in advance of the gubernatorial election. Though
Clark narrowly edged Seymour to capture the governorship,
Ullmann likely siphoned hundreds of Westchester voters from
his Whig opponent, almost leading to a Democratic victory. 74
But the Democrats surprisingly had more to fear from the rise
of the nativist party. As the election returns demonstrate, from
1853 to 1854, Democrats‟ share of the vote was slashed by
25%, whereas the Whig share of the vote declined by 13%,
which equaled the Know-Nothings‟ 38%. “From the number
of Know Nothings, it will be a task of much difficulty to elect a
Democrat from Westchester to Congress,” Eastern State
Journal editor Edmund Sutherland predicted, after observing
large defections from his party. His fears were valid. At the
1854 canvass, the Know-Nothing ticket polled pluralities in a
majority of Westchester municipalities. Westchester‟s
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Congressman, Bayard Clarke, was now a loyal member of the
Order, as were most countywide officials.75
By 1854, party lines had become dismantled and
traditional political apparatuses were rendered impotent. “A
perfect whirlwind seems to have passed over the county,
rooting up and tearing down all previous political calculations,
electing those in many instances least expecting to be elected,”
wrote Sutherland. This editor astutely observed that “from out
of the political chaos” of divided Whigs and Democrats, “the
Nativist element, with its secret and close organization called
„Know Nothing,‟ sprung up, absorbing materials of every
description of opinion and character.” Westchester Whigs
boasted that the Democratic Party had become “a house
divided against itself” because temperance and slavery
overshadowed party lines. Adding the secret political
organization of Know-Nothings into this political stew even
further clouded the electoral landscape. The large number of
parties, and the myriad of diverse issues at stake, represented
that the stability created by two-party competition during the
Second Party System had given way to chaos by the mid1850s. After the 1854 election, yet another threat to the
Jacksonian political system emerged in the form of a new
party.76
As anti-slavery sentiment intensified, it cleaved
existing fissures in the Whig Party and led to its complete
disintegration. The major turning point came in May 1854,
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when Congress passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act along
sectional, instead of party, lines. Sewardites, Barnburners, and
a few Softs who also opposed the act, joined with anti-liquor
politicos to found the Westchester Republican Party in 1855.
“Let all party differences be thrown to the winds,” proclaimed
a Whig-turned-Republican editor, who welcomed anyone
“whether hitherto known as a Democrat or Whig.” Meeting at
the spot in White Plains where the Provincial Congress of New
York had received the Declaration of Independence, the men at
the first County Republican Convention “disregarded their
former party associations by uniting” on a platform dominated
by anti-slavery policy. Specifically, Westchester Republicans
repudiated the influence of the Slave Power, opposed repeal of
the Missouri Compromise, and decried the fighting between
pro- and anti-slavery forces in the Kansas territory. Like the
handful of other northern suburban counties around New York
City, Boston, and Philadelphia, Westchester embraced a
moderate brand of Republicanism. The federal government
lacked the authority to meddle in states‟ affairs, the
Westchester platform contended, and thus could not abolish
slavery in the states where it already existed. Rather, the
institution should die gradually by excluding slavery from
western territories and rejecting admission of additional slave
states. The local 1855 platform almost exactly mirrored the
first national Republican one in 1856, which one historian
considers the handiwork of the party‟s moderate wing.77
Though free labor dominated Republican ideology,
the party in Westchester also organized to counter KnowNothingism. The county platform contained a unique plank
explicitly “repudiat[ing] the order of Know-Nothings.” Party
leaders considered Know-Nothings more threatening than
Democrats. In the first election the local Republicans
contested, they joined with Democrats to create an Anti-Know77
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Nothing Union County ticket “in opposition to the apostates
and renegades from all parties who have banded themselves
together in an oath-bound secret conspiracy.” Though New
Yorkers could choose from four statewide tickets in 1855, the
Hard Westchester Herald analyzed, “the local contest lies
between the secret unprincipled, and prospective order of
Know Nothings, and the PEOPLE without distinction as to the
former party ties.” The anti-Know-Nothing state senate
candidate, Benjamin Brandreth, published an editorial in
several Westchester papers declaring that, “the contest in this
campaign is not between Democrats and Republicans, but
between patriots and Know-Nothings.” Brandreth‟s appeal to
patriotic principles, in addition to his anti-slavery credentials,
mollified reluctant Republicans loath to support Democrats.
Opposing Know-Nothingism superseded party lines in
Westchester. According to the Eastern State Journal, “the
Whigs are ready to sustain Dr. Brandreth in this contest—not
because he is a Whig, for he is not…but to defeat the KnowNothing[s].”78
Though Westchester Know-Nothings consisted
primarily of ex-Democrats, they nonetheless enthusiastically
supported an ex-Whig for state senator. Their nominee, John
W. Ferdon, typified northern Know-Nothingism by supporting
the Maine Law and opposing the Kansas-Nebraska Act. But
Ferdon appealed to ex-Democrats primarily because he
opposed William H. Seward. As state senator in the 1840s,
Ferdon had supported Ogden Hoffman, a Democrat-turnedWhig, over Seward for U.S. Senate because the nativist
78
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opposed Seward‟s plan to create publicly funded schools for
Catholic children. Schooling again played a critical role in the
1855 election, and was perhaps the clearest policy distinction
between Ferdon and Brandreth. The Democrat had long
supported Seward‟s policy. Brandreth‟s status as an English
immigrant, moreover, enraged county Know-Nothings who
favored extending the naturalization period to twenty-one
years. Such a policy would have forced Brandreth to wait one
more year before earning citizenship, precluding him from
even running for office. Because both candidates opposed the
Kansas-Nebraska Act, national issues were minimized in the
1855 contest. Ethno-cultural issues figured most prominently.
On the one side, an ex-Whig Know-Nothing supported
embraced nativism and temperance. On the other, an exDemocrat “Unionist” rejected them.79
This strategy had mixed results. In the state senate
race, Brandreth narrowly carried Westchester, but in the
district, which also comprised Putnam and Rockland counties,
Ferdon, the Know-Nothing, won by a mere 62 votes out of
11,116 cast. Nevertheless, the anti-Know Nothing ticket won
both assembly seats and a host of local offices. The impressive
Republican showing indicated that the new party united the
political forces that had paralyzed Westchester Whigs. The
opportunity to converge with anti-slavery and temperance men
in a new political party opposed to Democrats and KnowNothings proved attractive to Sewardite Whigs, who shed their
old party label.80 This temporary coalition of Republicans, ex79
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Whigs, and Democrats sufficiently routed Know-Nothings in
local contests for coroner, surrogate, superintendent of the
poor, and county treasurer, among others. Joel T. Headley,
who headed the American ticket as nominee for secretary of
state, polled a plurality in Westchester, and the Know-Nothing
ticket polled pluralities statewide. Still hopelessly divided into
Softs and Hards, the Democratic Party was too crippled to
seriously contend for elective office. In Westchester, the party
system that dominated since Jackson‟s presidency was now
dead.81
The Democrats remained factionalized heading into
the 1856 presidential elections. The party‟s leading organ
attacked party leaders. “Setting aside both factitious
organizations now existing…which divide the ranks and break
down the energies of the party,” Sutherland suggested that the
decades-old organization “start anew.” Such antiparty
expressions a few months prior to the presidential election
seemed to foreshadow a weak performance at the polls. Fierce
inter-party competition in the immediate wake of the Second
Party System‟s collapse also complicated Democratic efforts
on two fronts: dissolving the 1855 fusion with Republicans and
defeating Know-Nothingism. Engulfed by antipartyism,
nativism, and slavery, Westchester became a bloody
battleground during the 1856 presidential campaign. 82
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Westchester Know-Nothings met with mixed
emotions Millard Fillmore‟s 1856 nomination for president on
the American Party ticket. “There is a strong feeling here
favorable to the American candidates,” Alexander Wells and
Abram Hyatt, prominent Ossining Know-Nothings, wrote
Daniel Ullmann. “We have plenty of votes.” Wells and Hyatt
supported Fillmore because they shared Whig antecedents. But
among Democrats who dabbled in Know-Nothingism,
Fillmore‟s nomination was not acceptable. “What Democrat,
who wishes well to his country, can vote for Fillmore?” asked a
Hard who sympathized with the Know-Nothings. “None
surely,” he answered, because a victorious Fillmore would dole
out patronage only to former Whigs. Paralyzed by internal
disputes between ex-Democrats and ex-Whigs, Know-Nothings
became crippled and would never again seriously contend for
elective office.83
If even Westchester Know-Nothings could not fully
shed their old party affiliations, then the American Party lacked
the cohesion required to wage a winning national campaign for
the presidency. Fillmore‟s candidacy confronted ex-Whigs
with a dilemma regarding slavery. As President he had signed
the controversial Compromise of 1850, which precipitated the
New York Whigs‟ split into Sewardites and Silver Grays.
Fillmore had led the conservative faction and still favored
conciliation with southern slave interests, a position which, by
1856, had become anathema to northern voters. Violent
conflicts over whether to allow slavery in the Kansas territory,
which came to a head in the months prior to the campaign,
persuaded anti-slavery Know-Nothings to cast their lot with the
Republican candidate, John Fremont, who ran on a free labor
platform. The election results indeed suggest that voters who
bolted from the Know-Nothings after 1855 migrated almost
entirely into the Republican fold. These mass defections
occurred because nativism was “made secondary to the
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question of Slavery,” analyzed an American Party voter.
Amidst this confusion among anti-slavery forces, the
Democratic candidate, James Buchanan, squeezed out a close
victory in county and a landslide in country.84
Little did Buchanan know that Westchesterites
ironically elected a Congressman who would become a sharp
thorn in his side. In 1856, New York‟s Ninth Electoral District,
comprised of Westchester, Putnam, and Rockland counties,
sent Democrat John B. Haskin to Washington. Born in 1821
into a family of New York shipping magnates, Haskin was
raised in Fordham on an estate that is now part of Woodlawn
Cemetery in the Bronx. After studying law, Haskin became
involved in Democratic politics when the political crisis of the
1850s commenced. As a conservative Hunker Democrat, he
resisted agitating the slavery question by refusing to take a
position on the Compromise on 1850 and by supporting the
Baltimore Platform of 1852, which affirmed the local character
of that divisive issue. He also staunchly opposed the Maine
Law and was elected to four consecutive terms as Town
Supervisor of West Farms, beginning in 1850, before the influx
of Protestant immigrants from New York City turned the
southern towns into prohibitionist enclaves. When it came to
state politics, Haskin opposed the $9 million bill to finance Erie
Canal improvements and considered his fellow Democrat,
Benjamin Brandreth, a foe for refusing to bolt the Assembly in
protest. By 1854, national events forced Haskin to take a stand
regarding slavery, so he supported Stephen Douglas‟ KansasNebraska Bill repealing the Missouri Compromise and
endorsing popular sovereignty. Now in Congress, Haskin was

84

Hudson River Chronicle, Dec. 8, 1857 (quotation); Gunja
Sengupta, For God and Mammon: Evangelicals,
Entrepreneurs, Masters and Slaves in Territorial Kansas,
1854-1860 (Athens, GA, 1996), 132. The New York State
Democrats had reconciled their differences in 1856 to present
a single united ticket for the presidential election. For election
results, see Table 4 in the Appendix; Board of Supervisors,
“Official Canvass,” 1855; New York Times, Nov. 25, 1856.

52

well positioned to take a pre-eminent role in the national
debates regarding the extension of slavery.85
Though slavery consumed national politics after the
election of 1856, in Westchester ethno-cultural issues remained
pre-eminent. Fillmore‟s poor showing made it clear that
Know-Nothings would soon cease to exist. And with local
elections in April and November 1857 quickly approaching,
Republicans sought to envelop the key swing voting bloc—
American Party voters. First, leaders re-nominated John
Ferdon, the Know-Nothing incumbent, for state senate, even
though the Republican rank-and-file had opposed his candidacy
in 1855. Second, the Republican-controlled state legislature
passed the Metropolitan Police Bill, which unified the police
departments of the City and several downstate counties,
including Westchester. In West Farms, Westchester, Pelham,
and Morrisania, Know-Nothings and Republicans alike
supported the bill based on their preference for law and order.
These areas‟ proximity to the City “exposed [them] to the
attacks of unscrupulous marauders,” most of whom, Rowe
charged, were immigrants. “We have come to resemble the city
in our moral as well as our physical character,” he decried. As
early as 1853, Edward Wells, the county District Attorney,
acknowledged that these southern towns along the Harlem
Railroad were disproportionately plagued by crime committed
by New Yorkers. Ferdon‟s vote in favor of the bill as state
senator encouraged Republicans to believe that nativists would
consider ethno-cultural issues at the ballot box and migrate into
their camp.86
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Democrats, in response, waged a vicious campaign
against Republican positions on the Police Bill, slavery, and
nativism. They vilified Ferdon for voting with the Republicans
to consolidate downstate police forces, which, they warned,
would result in Westchester‟s occupation—similar to the
British occupation of the colonies. To make matters worse,
county taxes would increase. Describing the “Black
Republican Party” as the refuge of aristocratic elites, the
Eastern State Journal charged that, according to party creed,
the government was “the omnipotent source of power, above
the people, instituted to control and manage them.” The
Democratic editor applied this philosophy to both slavery and
temperance. Denying Kansas popular sovereignty would turn
territorial residents into subjects of a monarchy in Washington,
while legislating morality turned government into a guardian
authority. Westchesterites, according to the Sutherland, could
either support Brandreth who thought “poor white people are as
good as Niggers,” or support Ferdon who was allegedly in
favor of black suffrage. As Know-Nothingism waned, the
Democrats and Republicans took opposing positions on a host
of national and local issues. If consensus destroyed the Second
Party System, conflict was fast constructing the Third.87
In the battle for the remnants of Westchester‟s
American Party, the Democrats bested the Republicans. Little
consensus exists on what caused this peculiar realignment. A
Republican blamed his party‟s 1857 defeat on “the general
combination of the American with the Democratic Party.” Low
turnout because of the off-year election compounded the
Republicans‟ woes. Sutherland correctly pointed out that
Democrats who had become Americans would switch back in
1857. Both Sutherland and contemporary historians have
pointed out that these voters had become fed up with the
nativists‟ impasse over slavery. Other historians have stressed
Nov. 22, 1853 in Charles E. Johnson, Proceedings of the
Board of Supervisors of Westchester County, NY (Yonkers,
1853), 1148.
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opposition to the Police Bill as the major 1857 election
determinant. The results for state senate seem to support this
conclusion. Though Ferdon polled better than the Republican
Party generally, he lost even in municipalities bordering New
York City that had the most vested interests in the Police Bill.
By 1857, most residents in these southern towns were migrants
from the City who still held strong allegiances to the
Democratic machine at Tammany Hall, which opposed ceding
control of the police force. Whereas most historians agree that
northern Know-Nothings generally migrated into the
Republican camp, in Westchester it appears that local issues
pushed them in droves towards the Democratic Party.88
Know-Nothings who flocked there would soon
discover that factional divisions regarding slavery once again
plagued their party. After disputes between pro-slavery and
anti-slavery settlers in Kansas erupted in violence, the official
territorial legislature met at Lecompton in 1857. There, they
passed a constitution allowing slavery and put the document to
the territorial inhabitants for an up-or-down vote, which antislavery forces boycotted. Amid this uproar, President
Buchanan endorsed the Lecompton Constitution. Democrats
splintered about whether to follow his lead. Senator Stephen
A. Douglas of Illinois led a faction in opposition to the
administration. They criticized the Lecompton Constitution
because the circumstances surrounding its passage seemed to
contravene the principle of popular sovereignty. Westchester‟s
Congressman, John Haskin, was one of twelve House
Democrats to cast his lot with Douglas, and against Buchanan.
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On a stifling evening in June 1858, Haskin rose to
address a crowd of 250 supporters, who had assembled to renominate him for Congress. The Lecompton Constitution, he
said “would have entailed upon that virgin territory [of Kansas]
the curse of Slavery.” Turning the election of 1858 into a
referendum on this issue alone, Haskin accused Buchanan, his
fellow Democrat, of abandoning the platform upon which he
was elected. Taking cues from Douglas, Haskin argued that the
Administration‟s policy of supporting a fraudulent constitution
denied Kansans the right to exercise democratic control over
local issues. Prominent Westchester Democrats, ex-Whigs,
Republicans, and Know-Nothings agreed with Haskin.
According to Robert H. Coles, an ex-Barnburner Democrat
from New Rochelle who attended the meeting, Haskin
“exposed one of the most…shameful swindles that was ever
perpetuated upon the Government.” Should his opponents
“succeed in disturbing and dividing our party, a wound will be
opened that will bleed more profusely than the wounds of
bleeding Kansas.”89
The partisan Democratic press not only opened these
wounds, they also poured salt into them. “We are perfectly
willing that the Republicans should take [Haskin] up and adopt
him as their own,” said Fenelon Hasbrouck, a Peekskill
Democratic editor who called for his fellow Democrat‟s
resignation from Congress. In White Plains, the Second
Assembly District convention adopted a resolution condemning
Haskin for his “adulterous communion with unscrupulous
Black Republicans, or Bastard Know-Nothings.” In the first
and third assembly districts as well, Democrats met to condemn
Haskin for breaking with the national administration at a time
when the major parties were still in flux. In April 1858,
Sutherland observed that Haskin was “languishing in the loving
embraces of Black Republicanism…he has excited disgust in
the minds of a large proportion of his constituents, who feel
that he has enacted the part of a betrayer of his party.” These
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vitriolic editorials continued throughout the summer and drove
a wedge through the county Democratic Party.90
What particularly incensed Westchester‟s Democratic
establishment was Republican support for Haskin. “I only
mean to make sure that Haskin shall be returned,” Horace
Greeley confided to a friend in the summer of 1858. The
Bedford resident publicly declared his support at the
Republican Congressional Convention, where the Committee
on Resolutions, which he chaired, reported that “Haskin
notably resisted every inducement to give his voice and vote
for the enslavement of Kansas….By thus discharging his
imperative duty as the representative of a free labor
constituency,” he had become an ideological ally with
Republicans, who published his name at the top of their ticket.
“We have only to choose between Mr. Haskin and a full blown
Lecompton Democrat. The election of a Republican is an
impossibility,” the Yonkers Examiner conceded before also
endorsing Haskin. Westchester Republicans had ample political
cover to support a Democrat, for Haskin was now “independent
of administrative requirements and party trammels.” Though
Westchester Republican leaders, especially Greeley, were
motivated by policy considerations to endorse Haskin, electoral
strategy also factored into this momentous decision.
Supporting anti-Administration Democrats, they hoped, would
divide the party and pave the way for a Republican victory in
the 1860 Presidential contest.91
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Consistent with their embrace of anti-Lecompton
Democrats, Republican leaders and editors now refused to
compromise with members of the fledging American Party.
“No fusion should take place whereby the Republican Party
shall sacrifice…its central principle of opposition to slavery,”
Rowe declared, though the local party welcomed nativists who
shared the free labor ideology. Westchester Republicans did
not incorporate into their platform nativist or temperance
policies. After American and Republican Party leaders failed
to unite on strong anti-slavery language at the statewide
nominating conventions, Rowe rationalized that his party stood
“better today because we have not incumbered ourselves with
unsympathizing comrades.” Sutherland, of course, spun this
impasse as a victory for his party. County Know-Nothings, he
editorialized, “regard any sort of connection with Black
Republicanism as political prostitution, and are fast arranging
themselves on the side of the National [pro-Buchanan]
Democracy.” An August declaration by Know-Nothing
Council #32 in Peekskill repudiating Haskin‟s stance on
Lecompton seemed to confirm Sutherland‟s analysis. Though
most Democratic candidates won in the 1858 contest, the local
electorate was sufficiently anti-Lecompton to reward Haskin‟s
independence with a second term in Congress. 92
As Democrats and Republicans took their seats in the
Thirty-Sixth Congress, in the summer and fall of 1859,
sectional discord hurtled towards climax over the slavery
extension issue. Abolitionist John Brown sought to stir up a
slave revolt by raiding a federal garrison in Harper‟s Ferry,
Virginia. Horace Greeley distributed Hinton Helper‟s The
Impending Crisis of the South, in which a southern farmer
argued that slavery blocked economic growth in his section.
And Haskin continued opposing Buchanan‟s Lecompton
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policy, proclaiming that he would “sooner co-operate with that
[Republican] party than with those who have…endeavored to
force a slave State into the Union.” These three events helped
re-orient the parties as sectional organizations, convinced the
South that the North would stop at nothing to destroy slavery,
and, according to Westchester Democrats, threatened the
Union, which they feared “cannot hold together under the
pressure of…Helper and John Brown.”93
The stakes for the 1860 Presidential election had been
set. Edmund Sutherland, editor of the most widely circulated
county paper, astutely predicted that the contest “will reduce
the political elements of the district and County into two
parties.” On the one side, the Democratic Party was paralyzed
regarding slavery: though the Westchester party opposed
extending slavery to the territories, southerners who wanted to
secure those rights dominated the national organization. Fed up
with decades of infighting in county, state, and nation, the
Highland Democrat lamented, “party strife has…assailed the
most sacred compacts of our Union.” On the other side, the
Republican Party stood in favor of abolishing slavery in
western territories and in favor of free labor, which included
Whiggish economic policies such as a protective tariff and
internal improvements. Choosing a new President was,
according to one editor, “the most important crisis through
which the country has been allowed to pass.” At risk was “the
perpetuity of the Union of these States.” 94
No campaign typified Democratic infighting better
than that of 1860. New York Democrats failed to coalesce
around a single candidate for the highest office in the entire
country. In July, the party assembled at Schenectady, about
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twenty miles west of Albany, to nominate a so-called People‟s
Union Ticket of presidential electors pledged against Abraham
Lincoln. They hoped that a composite ticket of electors for
Douglas, Breckinridge, and John Bell, the Constitutional Union
candidate, would prevent Lincoln from securing New York‟s
crucial thirty-five electoral votes. Indeed, had Lincoln lost the
entire South and the Empire State, he would have been left with
145 pledged electors—just seven shy of victory. The election
would then be thrown to the House of Representatives where a
Democrat could have won. Which Democrat was unimportant,
contended Sutherland, for “the defeat of Lincoln is the great
object to be effected.”95
The campaign quickly became ugly, even by
nineteenth-century standards. Westchester Democrats lobbed
racist volleys against Lincoln by suggesting that a Republican
victory would usher in black equality, “dragging [whites] down
to his low and bestial capacity.” Talk of “Black
Republicanism” became commonplace. When it came to
slavery policy, Westchester Democrats ignored the issue and
focused on developing industry, preserving nebulous
“economic rights,” and building a railroad to the Pacific. But
each of these issues was wrapped up in sectional controversy.
Would the transcontinental railroad, for example, pass through
free or slave territory? The Schenectady platform avoided this
key question.96
Republicans adopted a platform demonstrating that
by the end of the 1850s, the ethno-cultural issues that had
broken up the Second Party System had faded into the
background. Though the Yonkers Examiner had supported
New Yorker William H. Seward for the 1860 nomination, the
editor touted Lincoln‟s compelling life story and anti-slavery
credentials after the Illinoisan secured the nomination. Rowe
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rejected black equality but argued that extending slavery to the
territories placed hard-working whites at an economic
disadvantage. Popular sovereignty was not an acceptable
alternative because it was “destructive to law and order” by
frequently degenerating into deadly conflicts brought on by
outside agitators. In fact, Rowe‟s views more closely
paralleled the moderate Lincoln‟s than the radical Seward‟s.
Though his party had never won a major election in
Westchester, Rowe clearly drew the battle lines for the
Presidential contest.97
Lincoln swept the northern states on his way to a
landslide victory. But in Westchester, the
Democratic/Constitutional Union slate bested that of the
Republicans by about 10% of the vote. This rejection of
Republicanism took no Westchesterite by surprise; after all, the
county Democratic Party had won the previous four elections.
Nevertheless, Republicans rejoiced and Democrats sulked.
Westchester Democrats regretted the result, “not so much on
party grounds, as for the continued peace and prosperity of the
country.” The most important question confronting
Westchesterites—and all Americans—in the wake of the first
Republican presidential victory was whether Lincoln should
“attempt by force of arms to coerce [the South] back, and thus
plunge the country into all the horrors of a civil war.” Though
Sutherland hated Lincoln, he nonetheless concluded that the
Union, “which cost our fathers so much toil and sacrifices and
blood to establish,” was worth preserving. On this much, both
parties agreed.98
Yet during the loose party times of the 1850s, the
Democratic Party dominated Westchester County‟s politics.
The candidate at the top of their ticket lost only two elections
during the decade—both to a third party that did not survive
past 1858. Although the Republican Party emerged out of the
chaos of the 1850s as the northern sectional party, Westchester
remained an anomalous bastion of anti-Lincoln voters.
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Proximity to New York City accounted for much of this
sentiment. As Westchester transitioned from rural to
suburban, the county was pulled into the City‟s political orbit.
And City-dwellers, just like their neighbors to the north,
overwhelmingly favored the Democrats.
The local transition from the Second to Third Party
Systems, moreover, produced unique political alignments.
Perhaps no other northern county saw Republicans fuse with
Democrats to counter the Know-Nothings. Three years later,
Westchester Republicans again endorsed an anti-slavery
Democrat for Congress rather than nominate one of their own.
These two fusions demonstrated that Westchesterites voted for
people who shared their ideology instead of consistently
supporting a particular political party. The county‟s
experience with Know-Nothingism also illustrated this
peculiar trend. Whereas most historians view the nativist
party as a stepping-stone from the Whigs to the Republicans,
Westchester Know-Nothings primarily held Democratic
antecedents. When the Know-Nothings disintegrated after the
1858 elections, its supporters, who most ardently embraced
the party‟s ideology, migrated almost entirely back into the
Democratic fold. Fluid party affiliation weakened political
organizations, facilitating the massive realignment of the
1850s.
Ethno-cultural issues bear primary responsibility for
realigning Westchester‟s electorate. Examining issues
affecting everyday life, such as nativism and temperance,
reveals that the Whig Party began unraveling well before the
Kansas-Nebraska Act passed in 1854. The Democratic Party,
too, suffered from fissures generated not by slavery, but by
Erie Canal financing, the Maine Law, and antiparty sentiment.
Slavery may have led to the ultimate extinction of the Second
Party System on the national level, but state and local
campaigns in off-year elections, such as the unusual 1855
contest, profoundly influenced political realignments. KnowNothings elevated ethno-cultural issues to thrive in
Westchester during two non-Presidential elections. This party,
in turn, siphoned voters from the Whigs and Democrats,
challenged the nascent Republican Party, and led to the
Second Party System‟s mortality. It is impossible to tell the
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story of how these four nationally competitive political parties
divided, disintegrated, or formed without considering forces
operating on the county and town levels. Most voters had
closer ties with elected officials at home than with those in
Washington, and thus ethno-cultural and financial issues—the
stuff of local politics—induced voters to flee from the Whig
Party and to change the complexion of the Democratic Party.
Towards the end of the 1850s, however, ethnocultural issues had lost salience. By 1856, slavery consumed
political affairs at all levels of government, filled the editorial
pages of Westchester‟s partisan press, and strengthened the
Republican Party pledged to preserve the principle of free
labor. John Jay, grandson of the first Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, was one of the first Westchesterites to join the
local party. On the eve of the 1860 election, Jay addressed a
meeting of county Republicans in Bedford, down the block
from the Post Office where William Robertson had cast his
ballot in 1848. “It will be wise for the slaveholders, instead of
harping on dissolution, to prepare for the abolition of slavery,”
he suggested, “not by the action of the Republican party, but
by the operation of natural laws, that neither individuals nor
parties can restrain.” Although Jay‟s appeal did not sway his
fellow Westchesterites to support Lincoln in 1860, the “natural
laws” he cited ultimately triumphed over party and sectional
divisions during the Civil War, culminating in emancipation
and Union war victory. During the 1850s, Westchesterites
transcended, blurred, and erased party lines regarding dozens
of issues—most prominently on nativism, temperance, and
slavery. After these ten years of loose party times, they again
subordinated partisanship to principle. When the south
seceded, Westchesterites finally found a universal rallying
point: saving the very Union that gave birth to their political
parties.99
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Westchester County Newspapers: Parties and
Editors
Newspaper

Party

Editor

Eastern State Journal

Democratic (Barnburner, Hard)

Edmund G. Sutherlan

Highland Democrat

Democratic

Fenelon Hasbrouck

Hudson River Chronicle

Whig (Silver Gray)/American

William Howe

Peekskill Republican

Whig (Sewardite)/Republican

J.J. Chambers

Westchester Herald

Democratic (Hunker, Hard)

Caleb Roscoe

Westchester Gazette

Nonpartisan/Temperance

Eugene Hyde; John C

Yonkers Examiner

Republican

M.F. Rowe

Sec. of State)
Governor)

Table 2. Percentage of Vote Won by Political Party, 18531854
Whig
Soft Dem.
Hard Dem.
Know-Nothing
39.5
21.7
39.8
-25.8
30.9
5.7
37.6
Table 3. Percentage of Vote Won by Political Party, 18541855
Whig
Soft Dem.
Hard Dem.
1854 (Governor)
25.8
30.9
5.7
1855 (Sec. of State)
-7
32.0

Know3
3

Table 4. Percentage of Vote Won by Political Party, 18551856
Republican

Soft Dem.
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Hard Dem.

Know-Nothing

855 (Sec. of State)
856 (President)

22.3
35.3

7.0

32.0
36.4

38.7
28.3

Table 5. Percentage of Vote Won by Political Party, 18561857

1856 (President)
1857 (Sec. of State)

Republican
35.3
27.5
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Democratic
36.4
52.6

Know-Noth
28.3
19.9

“All May Visit the Big Camp”: Race and the Lessons of
the Civil War at the 1913 Gettysburg Reunion
Evan Preston
Shaping historical memory means extracting lessons
from the past. Those lessons frame the debate about the nature
of the present. Just months after the inauguration of Woodrow
Wilson, the attention of most of the nation focused on the
events scheduled to commemorate the semi-centennial of what
was by then increasingly viewed as “the turning point” of the
Civil War.100 The reunion at Gettysburg in 1913 constituted
the contemporary public exegesis of the status of American
memory of the Civil War. In this respect, the reunion in
Gettysburg reflected the erasure of the legacy of emancipation
and the unfulfilled promise of equality for African-Americans.
Yet, almost all the public discourse at Gettysburg reflected no
sense of disappointment; rather, the battle now represented a
triumph of the American spirit. The presence of AfricanAmerican veterans would have complicated the message of
white reconciliation at the reunion. Reckoning with the
honorable service of black troops was not something
mainstream American society felt comfortable with in 1913.
Whether or not black veterans attended the fiftieth anniversary
of Gettysburg is a small detail which illuminates a profoundly
broader pair of subjects: the meaning of the Civil War and the
nature of American race relations in 1913. In answering this
question of black veterans at the Gettysburg reunion, the
broader context of the organization and execution of the
reunion, the lessons drawn from the ceremonies in Gettysburg,
explicit discussions of race at the reunion and contemporary
African-American perspectives must all be explored.
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Carol Reardon is the most eminent modern historian
to embrace the idea that black veterans were both invited to
and attended the 1913 reunion at Gettysburg. Reardon claims
the organizers of the reunion in Gettysburg invited black
veterans to participate fully in the celebrations, and a few
went, but in Jim Crow America, they were housed on their
own separate street in the tent camp.”101 Reardon further notes
that white veterans enjoyed the behavior of the AfricanAmericans in the camp. Reardon‟s only apparent source for
this assertion is Civil War veteran Walter Blake‟s account of
his journey to Gettysburg, Hand Grips. Reardon is not the
only prominent historian to recently address the question of
black veterans in 1913 Gettysburg. In his analysis of race in
the memory of the American Civil War, David Blight
propounds a conclusion contradictory to Reardon‟s claim.
Blight argues that while according to the main organizers, the
Pennsylvania Commission, black veterans were implicitly
eligible to attend the reunion, “research has turned up no
evidence that any [black veterans] did attend.”102 Writing on
earlier reunions at Gettysburg along with 1913, James Weeks
writes that “first-person accounts describe black veterans
attending the spectacle” of reunions in Gettysburg. 103 Weeks is
unclear as to whether he believes the accounts but he also
observes “the ceremonies and official pronouncements
disregarded racial matters altogether.” In fact, Weeks never
directly cites a primary source concerning the 1913 reunion at
Gettysburg. Instead, Weeks appears to cite only other works
by David Blight in reference to the 1913 reunion in particular.
In spite of his reliance on Blight‟s work, Weeks conveys a
subtly different message than Blight by being less declarative
about the lack of reliable evidence to substantiate claims of
black veterans‟ attendance in 1913. At the core of this
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historiographical debate is the single contemporary account
involving black veterans at the reunion.
Walter Herbert Blake was a Union veteran of the
Civil War from New Jersey. In 1913, he and other veterans
embarked on an expedition to the Gettysburg reunion. Blake
wrote a travel narrative of his group‟s experiences on during
the expedition. To assess the credibility of Blake‟s claims it is
helpful to examine his entire account. Blake is illustrative of
the spirit of the reunion, believing the “wonderful conclave”
of veterans in Gettysburg would allow the North and the South
to “understand each other as they never did before”. 104
Veterans of each side remembered acts of kindness during the
war, though the Southerners remained decidedly unapologetic
about their actions. Initially, the Confederate veterans of
General George Pickett‟s Virginians concerned some of
Blake‟s Northern comrades since the Confederates wore an
emblem with the phrase “SIC SEMPER TYRANNIS”, which
many Union veterans associated most with John Wilkes
Booth‟s declaration after assassinating Abraham Lincoln. 105
Blake condescendingly observed that “those better informed
realized there was no connection” between the Southerners
attire and the assassination of President Lincoln since the
phrase in question was merely Virginia‟s state motto, existing
on Virginia‟s State Seal generations before Booth‟s actions in
1865. Blake noted that the United Confederate Veterans
declared the lesson of the war to be a validation of “the utter
impossibility of the dismemberment of the Union”. 106
Only three pages of Blake‟s 203-page narrative
mentioned African-Americans. In the first half of the
narrative, the perceived conduct of the organizers angered
Blake because they planned “only for negroes from the Union
side, forgetful of the fact that there were many faithful slaves
104
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who fought against their own interest in their intense loyalty to
their Southern masters”.107 Blake noted there were black
people in both groups of veterans. In this assertion Blake
voiced the well-established trope of the mythic legion of
“loyal slaves” but Blake ventured further than the traditional
narrative about loyal slaves in his alleged observations of
Southerners in the camp. The idea of substantial numbers of
African-Americans serving as soldiers for the Confederacy
has been thoroughly refuted in recent historiography; Blake‟s
desire to claim this myth is not unusual for his era though this
point illustrates the ways in which Blake‟s account must be
used cautiously when attempting to establish facts about the
reunion based upon his word. 108
Blake‟s perspective appears limited in more than one
instance and his writing on African Americans raises
questions about how well he understood the status of race
relations from the perspective of blacks in the age of
American apartheid. Blake claimed “some colored boys from
the Southland” found their way into the camp of veterans and
were promptly sheltered by “the big-hearted Tennessee
delegation”, giving the black men “a special tent” of their
own.109 Blake included a second major act of Southern
beneficence toward blacks in his account. Developing the
story in an almost stream-of-consciousness transition, it seems
writing about the “colored comrades” reminded Blake of other
black people in the camp. Blake recalled Confederates
walking down near his tent when they encountered “an old
negro, Samuel Thompson.” Immediately, Thompson saluted
the Confederates and the Confederates responded in a manner
Blake construed as friendly. The Confederates assured
Thompson they were “glad” to meet him and told him “we-all
want to shake hands with you, nigger, an‟ to say as we have
some niggers at home just as big as you”. 110 Blake portrayed
107
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the black man‟s response as amicable, emphasizing that
“EVERY ONE of the Southerners” shook hands with the man
identified as Thompson.111 In the interaction between blacks
and white Southerners, as with his other descriptions of Union
veterans meeting Confederate veterans, the hand shake
represented the ultimate sign of complete reconciliation for
Blake, the motif and attestation of friendliness. The mere idea
the Confederates could extend a hand to “their dark-skinned
brother” was proof to Blake that there was “no color line
here”.112 On this point however, Blake later contradicted
himself. Blake identified a single street of the tent camp for
veterans “devoted entirely to negro soldiers”.113 These black
men encountered no discrimination and “they were treated just
like the others and had the time of their lives”, according to
Blake.114 Such men proved entertaining as the “great
attraction” to their area of the camp since they regularly
played “old plantation melodies”.115 This paragraph emerged
as an interjection in Blake‟s narrative of the commemoration
of the action of July third 1863. Blake did not introduce the
lines with any fuller context nor did he dwell on the subject.
The possibility that the black men were some of the many
laborers in the camp never appears in Blake‟s writing.
Blake‟s observations deserve some context in the
geography of Gettysburg. Most of the African-American
residents of Gettysburg lived in the southwestern district of the
town, the Third Ward, proximate to the edge of the veterans‟
camp. When this fact is considered alongside the well
documented evidence of blacks working in the camp during
the reunion, a clear possibility emerges to suggest the black
men Blake observed were not invited veterans attending the
reunion but simply black people who happened to be in or
near the camp as workers or local residents. Moreover, the
pictures published with Blake‟s book show black cooks and
camp laborers, though Blake never acknowledged the role of
111
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these blacks. The pictures in Blake‟s account serve as a
narrative unto themselves, sometimes providing a divergent
message from Blake‟s words. In an ostensibly unintentional
reflection on the vital role of the labor of African-Americans
in American society, Blake‟s publisher included a poem below
the photograph of the black cooks which read: “We can live
without friends, We can live without books, But civilized man
cannot live without cooks”.116 Clearly, Blake‟s travel journal
contained stunning stories, but how many of his most colorful
assertions could be corroborated outside his book? Who was
invited to Gettysburg?
Organization of the semi-centennial reunion was a
joint venture between the Federal government and each
individual state government, though the vast majority of
responsibility was split between the Federal government and
Pennsylvania. The Federal government appropriated money to
provide tents and supplies for an estimated 40,000 veterans. In
an April, 3, 1912 Concurrent Resolution of Congress, the
government planned to provide “material support and
accommodation of veterans, including sewage, water, hospital
services and policing”.117 A “big camp” with centralized
latrines and medical care would house the veterans during
their stay. Nowhere in the War Department‟s report are
African-Americans mentioned and no trace of a “separate
street” for black veterans remains on the maps detailing the
layout of the tent camp.118 Instead, veterans were organized by
state or territory. The Pennsylvania Commission nominally
invited and offered to pay transportation fees inside
Pennsylvania of “all honorably discharged soldiers . . . sailors
and marines”, of either side of the war that enlisted in
Pennsylvania, or for those living in Pennsylvania in 1913. The
stated purpose of the Pennsylvania commission was to
organize “a general reunion of the veterans of the Union and
Confederate Armies,” for “the first time since the close of the
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Civil War.”119 The Field Secretary of the Gettysburg
Battlefield Memorial Association, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis
Beitler, disseminated this list of qualifications and benefits to
local and national papers.120 Pennsylvania and New York
spent the most on the reunion, appropriating $450,000 and
$150,000 respectively.121 Pennsylvania spent over $140,000
on transporting veterans alone.122 All told, the States
appropriated “about $1,000,000”, including $150,000 of
Federal funding.123 Pennsylvania estimated 54,928 veterans
attended the ceremonies. The Pennsylvania Commission
proudly included in its report the invitation issued by General
C. Irvine Walker, Lieutenant General Commanding the United
Confederate Veterans (U.C.V.), which encouraged Southern
attendance since “all surviving soldiers of the war of the South
and of the North will be invited guests”. 124 Pennsylvania and
Vermont remained open to veterans who had not served at
Gettysburg, and New York gave preference to veterans of the
battle, followed by veterans with the longest service
records.125 Though the initial intention of the gathering was to
include all veterans of the Civil War wishing to attend, many
states ultimately supported only veterans of the Battle of
Gettysburg. The Indiana Commission specifically invited

119

“Fiftieth Anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg: Report of
the Pennsylvania Commission, December 31, 1913.”
Harrisburg, PA: WM. Stanley Ray State Printer, 1915. ix.
120
Lt. Col. Lewis Beitler to unnamed paper editor. Gettysburg
College Vertical Files: Kramer, Frank H.
121
“Pennsylvania Commission,” vii. “Fiftieth Anniversary of
the Anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg: Report of the
New York State Commission” (Albany: J.B. Lyon Company,
1916), 18.
122
“Pennsylvania Commission,” 114.
123
“On the Field of Gettysburg: Celebration of the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the Great Battle”, Adams County News January
4, 1913.
124
“Pennsylvania Commission,” 9.
125
“New York State Commission,” 92, 96.

72

individual units.126 By choosing to invite only those veterans
who fought at Gettysburg, Indiana passed directly over the
28th Regiment Indiana Infantry who became the 28th United
States Colored Troops.127 By choosing to invite only veterans
of Gettysburg, Indiana and other states made it unnecessary to
disinvite black veterans. This decision was made despite the
fact the bill authorizing the federal government to organize a
reunion at Gettysburg encouraged “each State [to] send to
Pennsylvania all surviving Veterans of the Civil War resident
within such states”.128 Cost doubtlessly influenced the decision
of states choosing to invite only Gettysburg veterans. Thus it
is very difficult to argue race was the fundamental reason
some states decided to send only Gettysburg veterans.
Logistics and funding would have been a rather substantial
obstacle to the inclusion of all living and willing Civil War
veterans. Even if it was not the specific intention of state
legislatures, the consequence of this decision seems to have
been an effective exclusion of many black veterans since they
would now have to pay their way to the reunion if they wished
to attend. States limiting the eligibility for official support of
attendance to Gettysburg veterans would have had to
explicitly invite black veterans to the reunion. Neither the
New York report nor the Indiana report contained any such
invitations and the Pennsylvania report never explicitly invited
African-American veterans. While there is no clear evidence
of an invitation of black veterans, there is equally no clear
evidence in the state commission reports of an explicit
prohibition of African-Americans attending the ceremonies in
Gettysburg. It is difficult to absolutely prove the negative
point that blacks were not invited, lacking a positive statement
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of their prohibition. As a result, events, tone and message of
the reunion are important pieces of circumstantial evidence
about the question of an invitation as they are fundamental
direct evidence for determining if blacks attended.
The theme of reconciliation animated the public
actions at the reunion. Some began to refer to the event as the
“great peace reunion”. With the possible exception of a
drunken stabbing in a bar, the reunion was peaceful. 129 UCV
leader Gen. Walker welcomed “the hand of peace” offered by
Union veterans in inviting the Confederates to come en
masse.130 William E. Mickle, Adjutant General and Chief of
Staff of the Grand Army of the Republic (G.A.R.), joined
Walker in calling for all those of his organization who were
capable to attend the reunion to do so.131 The G.A.R. and the
U.C.V. worked together to, in the words of G.A.R.
Commander-in-Chief H.M. Trimble, erase “forever any
lingering prejudices and bitterness that may have survived”
from the War.132 More than one local reporter wrote of the
story also mentioned by Walter Blake of one Union veteran
and one Confederate veteran meeting at the reunion, buying a
hatchet in Gettysburg and literally “burying the hatchet” on
the battlefield.133 The potent imagery of this story gained
national attention. Another local paper exhorted any veteran
still with “bitterness in his heart” to “bury it on the battlefield
where the ashes of brave men have found sepulchre”. 134
Northern reporters seemed eager to obtain the opinions of
former Confederates, finding subjects sincerely interested in
reconciliation. One former Confederate confessed he and his
comrades “love our country not because of the great war but
because of what has happened since the war.” Crucially, the
veteran referred to the United States, rather than the South or
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his state, when he spoke of “our country”. 135 Here, the former
Rebel stated perhaps more than he meant. “What” had
occurred since the war was nothing less than an easing of
sectional tension at the expense of black rights by means of a
political retreat from Radical Reconstruction‟s promise of
greater racial equality and a legal evisceration of the most
egalitarian legislation from the post-war period by the
Supreme Court. Nonetheless, Southerners had not forgotten
the threat of racial equality and many Northerners felt
compelled to admit their former policies were misguided at
best. The Lieutenant Governor of Rhode Island, Roswell B.
Burchard, actually issued an encomium to the South because it
did not remain bitter about “the errors of reconstruction, where
they were committed more than the North”.136 Though
Burchard declared that “brothers cannot forget the death of
brothers”, he also argued that it is the shared recognition of
loss on each side that allows for reconciliation.137
Mutual recognition of strenuous loyalty to principles,
shared loss and manly gallantry constituted this
reconciliationist “soldier‟s faith” which overwhelmed the
ideological legacy of the War.138 Margaret Creighton
explained this cultural shift to mean that “Gettysburg‟s
importance…was not that it helped deliver a death blow to
slavery; rather, it helped tighten white blood ties”.139 The
“bloody shirt” rhetoric, urging remembrance of the war dead
along with the reasons for war and the fault of Southerners for
bringing the carnage of battle, had largely passed out of use by
1913, with the exception prominent African-Americans. At
Gettysburg, strands of the rhetoric of loss were woven into a
new fabric of nationalism as the “bloody shirt” became the
family tablecloth in a feast of reunion. Virginia Governor
William Hodges Mann articulated a new desire for
135
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cooperation and a new belief in the national spirit. The North
and South could now work together in war, as they had in
1898. Mann confidently proclaimed that “if we have to call for
troops to repel a foreign enemy” he was sure “that our sons
will meet them at the gate”.140 White supremacy formed the
bedrock of that nationalism. One local publication ventured so
far as to quote famed abolitionist Henry Ward Beecher‟s
wartime explanation of the difficulty of conquering the South;
speaking to a British audience, Beecher was quoted as
explaining that “Northern armies had to fight men of their own
race”, a fight of equals.141 This was not an entirely accurate
assessment of Beecher‟s views on race; he may have been
referring to a “national” race of “Americans”. Even so, the
local paper wanted to read Beecher out of context to make its
point.
National press coverage reflected the sentiments of
nationalism expressed in Gettysburg. Helen Longstreet,
widow of Confederate General James Longstreet, delineated
an interpretation of the Civil War which expanded from
Beecher‟s supposed elucidation of white supremacy to include
a celebration of white nationalism without ever even
addressing the subject of African-Americans. Mrs. Longstreet
argued that the meaning of Gettysburg ought to inspire all true
“white” Americans because at Gettysburg the white race again
proved its worth. In the context of giving an account of the
commemoration of Pickett‟s Charge, which Helen claimed for
her late husband, Mrs. Longstreet argued that “the mettle that
wrestled and triumphed here is the mettle that for twelve
centuries has kept the hope of the Anglo-Saxon undimmed”.142
Gettysburg was glorious and important because there fought
“Anglo-Saxon against Anglo-Saxon” and proved each side‟s
continued commitment to “the cause of human liberty”.
Longstreet proffered a strong argument for white nationalism
but it was not wholly original. Edward Linenthal, historian of
140
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battlefields and memory, notes that the Gettysburg Compiler
argued as early as 1903 that the field should be preserved as a
reminder of “immortal Anglo-Saxon bravery”.143 Even G.A.R.
chief, Alfred B. Beers argued the war was a “conflict waged
by men of the same race”, but Beers spoke no words about
African-American soldiers in this statement.144 The Outlook
echoed the nationalism of Governor Mann‟s speech but
appeared moderate in comparison with the widow Longstreet.
Outlook boasted Teddy Roosevelt as contributing editor, still
promoting his “New Nationalism” after an electoral defeat in
1912. Outlook‟s editorial board embodied the reconciliationist
interpretation of the Civil War. Outlook editors cited the most
succinct declaration of the meaning of the reunion in the
statement of one Union veteran that the reunion was his last
chance to do something “for the Union”. 145 The same veteran
remembered the battle of Gettysburg as “the time the Union
was saved”.146 Outlook editors, either out of ignorance or
purposeful omission, noted the importance of veterans
decorating the graves at the National Cemetery but failed to
mention the fact this was an entirely one-sided endeavor as the
Confederate dead were not buried there. In a later edition,
Herbert Francis Sherwood reported that the true lesson of the
reunion lay in the speech by Secretary of War Lindley
Garrison who said “the field of enmity has become the field of
amity”.147 Sherwood remarked how veterans could tease one
another about shooting each other and literally bury the
hatchet, in one case; he viewed this as the greatest “proof that
the war is over”.148 Even someone identified as a “citizen of
Richmond” testified that “we are one people now”. 149 Neither
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the correspondent nor the Southerner ever broached the topic
of African-Americans, much less African-American veterans;
the “people” now united did not refer to the experience of
blacks during the war or in 1913. Woodrow Wilson felt no
need to mention the racial legacy of the Civil War. Wilson‟s
speech in Gettysburg unified the themes of nationalism and
American progress while still ignoring any concept of racial
tensions. Wilson extolled the triumph of America in a new age
in which “there is no one within its borders, there is no power
among the nations of the earth, to make it afraid”. 150 Yet,
Wilson mixed his triumphalism with a challenge to America to
live up to “its own great standards”, a bitterly ironic comment
given Wilson‟s record on race.
Though the themes of nationalism and reconciliation
dominated the national narrative the white press coverage was
not completely unanimous. Though Wilson shared some
elements of liberalism with the editors of The Independent,
they drew distinctly different lessons from the reunion in
Gettysburg. The Independent continued, to some degree, the
legacy of its Civil War era editor, Henry Ward Beecher. The
Independent offered a more complicated reflection on the
reunion at Gettysburg than most national press coverage.
Independent editors chose to open their publication for the
week of July 3, 1913 with a reprinting of their editorial from
July 9, 1863. Written by Henry Ward Beecher‟s successor at
The Independent Theodore Tilton, the 1863 piece offered a
rousing partisan celebration of the defeat of the Confederates.
Tilton explained that the Union army had blocked Lee and the
South on their “triumphal way to the establishment of the
Slave Power”.151 In republishing this editorial, the 1913
editors of The Independent did not shrink from Tilton‟s
position. Rather, the paper affirmed Beecher‟s fight for
“justice and freedom for the slave”.152 Thus the editors
reaffirmed not only the ending of slavery, something not
150
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mentioned by Outlook, but also the promise of justice for
former slaves. The editors of The Independent agreed that the
reunion at Gettysburg was a “very happy” occasion. 153
Independent editors credited “the God of armies” for
bestowing the twin blessings of “union of all the states, and
liberty for all the people”. In this statement however, the
editors overestimated the degree to which “liberty” had been
realized by blacks in America; their declaration evoked
accomplishment but not continued struggle. Still, The
Independent stood out for its courage as a non-black paper
addressing the emancipationist legacy of the war in 1913.
Moreover, The Independent re-introduced the concept of race
while mentioning African-Americans, with at least some
agency, in the discussion of the meaning of the Civil War.
Racial identification, racial hierarchy and racial pride
all found expression in Gettysburg. The racial dynamics of the
reunion comprise perhaps the most powerful circumstantial
evidence to support the position that black veterans were at
least indirectly disinvited to the reunion. Blacks visited
Gettysburg regularly, usually in September around the
anniversary of the issuance of the Preliminary Emancipation
Proclamation.154 Thousands of blacks rode into Gettysburg on
trains at least once a year. These “colored excursions” were
not palatable to many white Gettysburg residents. In 1913,
local papers warned residents that “part of Baltimore‟s
innumerable colored population” would be “dumped” on the
town.155 The arrival of black tourists invariably corresponded
with a rash of news covering any and all, or more than actually
existed, of their debauchery. The excursion of 1910 proved
especially heinous to the white locals. The Adams County
News patronizingly praised some black tourists for their “far
and passable” behavior only to highlight a black man acting
like “a four-legged animal” and as a “half-clad” black woman
153
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slatternly flaunted herself in the town square. 156 The same
paper was sure to record every member of the tourist
contingent indulging in alcohol. Considering the climate of
suspicion about any black visitors to Gettysburg, it seems
highly probable that if there had been any noticeable number
of black veterans in attendance at the 1913 reunion, at least
one of the local papers would have warned the population.
While there were many events occurring during the reunion
which hypothetically could have distracted local reporters, the
Gettysburg Times managed to notice the single NativeAmerican veteran in attendance. “Chief Dwan-O-Guah”, or
David Warrior of the 1st New York Light Artillery, received
enough attention to merit a small but separate article. If the
Times noticed one Indian veteran, would the paper not also, in
all likelihood, have noticed the multiple black veterans
mentioned by Blake? It is possible the papers simply
purposefully neglected to report the presence of black troops.
Certainly most of the coverage of the reunion ignored the
blacks working at the camp, despite the pictures proving the
efforts of African-Americans during the massive spectacle. 157
Nowhere in the reporting on the thousands of food workers or
tent builders are African-Americans identified in print as the
laborers.158
Northerners, in general, had not always ignored
African-Americans. Immediately after the Civil War, white
Union veterans “routinely collaborated with AfricanAmericans in honoring the war dead”.159 However, by 1900,
“there were just three monuments to black soldiers in the
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northern United States and none in Pennsylvania”. 160 While
the North tried to forget African-American “service” in the
war, attempting to forget even their very existence after
Reconstruction, the South expanded its active remembrances
of a type of African-American. Monuments to “loyal slaves”
were built by Southerners reconstructing their history. 161
In Lumberton, North Carolina, merely weeks after
Gettysburg‟s commemoration in 1913, locals organized “a
sumptuous dinner” to be served in honor of “former
servants”.162 In the reporting of this event, local journalists
used the terms “slave” and “servant” interchangeably,
suggesting their opinion of the degree of new liberty for
African-Americans. The North Carolinians agreed with Walter
Blake and lamented the fact “hitherto no public recognition
has been given to the loyalty and devotion of the slaves, the
„colored veterans‟ whose number is rapidly diminishing”. 163
Southerners at Gettysburg fought to spread a similar
understanding about the true legacy of the war and its
implications for race relations in 1913. In an address published
by the Pennsylvania Commission another North Carolinian
and Confederate veteran, Sergeant John C. Scarborough,
conceded that during the Civil War Southerners had been
“afraid that the negroes would rise behind us”. 164 Scarborough
assured the Gettysburg audience that “our fears were all
misplaced because the negro was quiet and as safe and
thoroughly imbued with the idea of the principle that was
involved and was loyal to the South as he was to his master
and mistress”.165 Scarborough articulated a version of the
“white man‟s burden” but his imagery painfully invoked the
physical memory of slavery; he argued that whites must take
the lesson of the Civil War to be the greatness and
160
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indissolubility of White America. Using their renewed
strength, white Americans must uplift blacks and “show to
[the negro] that we are his friends and tie him to us with hooks
of steel [emphasis added] and he will reward us for what we
do for him”.166
Scarborough‟s message would have doubtless
seemed repugnant to the African-Americans of Gettysburg.
Gettysburg contained black veterans, including John Watts,
Lloyd Watts and Randolph Johnston. 167The service of black
men was not always ignored. In fact, “during the war, the
borough‟s Democratic paper had devoted considerable column
space to these men”. Yet even during the war this attention
was degrading. Black troops were depicted as quick to “turn
tail and run” at Petersburg and elsewhere; though, being a
Democratic paper it possessed some potential incentive in
addition to racism to attack the Union war effort. 168 Black
residents of Gettysburg faced severe dangers on the homefront as well. In a compendium of oral histories of Civil War
battles, some interviews of African-Americans from
Gettysburg survived. The accounts were published in 1915 but
the oral histories were conducted near the time of the reunion
in 1913. While the lack of proper names in the accounts is
disconcerting, the details of the accounts do not on the surface
appear ridiculous. In fact the compiler, Clifton Johnson,
demonstrated noteworthy tact for his time by seeking to probe
“the comments of the blacks on the whites and those of the
whites on the blacks, though sometimes uncharitable and
unjust”.169 In one account, a black man identified merely as
“the colored farm hand” recalled his surety during July of
1863 that “if the Rebels had happened to come through they‟d
have took [horses] and me, too”.170 For other local blacks, the
potential positive or negative consequences of the war seemed
166
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an almost absent concept in remembering the battle. A black
woman identified as “the colored servantmaid [sic]” offered
only one paragraph of reflection on the war beyond her vivid
account of some of the violence of the battle; she repeated that
the war years were “rough times” and that “if they ever fight
again in this country I don‟t want to be around”.171 In 1866,
black veterans from Gettysburg formed a fraternal society
called the “Sons of Good Will” but by 1913, no record of any
fraternal organization of black veterans appeared in local
papers in connection with the reunion activities. 172 This
decline in black organization was met with an increase of
white organization when the Ku Klux Klan established itself
in Gettysburg in the 1920s.173
Instead of focusing on Gettysburg, many black
Americans turned their attention to the events in Boston in late
July. While Gettysburg and most of white America celebrated
the reunion at Gettysburg, an African-American paper, the
Chicago Defender, dedicated its weekly issue to the
persecution of boxing champion Jack Johnson. The headline
of the July fifth edition read “JACK JOHNSON IS
CRUCIFIED FOR HIS RACE”, referring to Johnson‟s
conviction for traveling across state lines with a “prostitute”
who was actually his white girlfriend. 174 The events of July 18,
1863, the battle of Fort Wagner, concerned the black
community represented by the Defender much more than the
events of Gettysburg in 1913. In this action the famed 54 th
Massachusetts led an ill-fated but tremendously courageous
assault on a coastal defense bastion at Charleston. In Boston, a
proud celebration of the service of African-Americans
presented reflections on the current state of affairs in the
nation. The Defender noted that although the rest of the nation
focused on the “elaborate celebrations” at Gettysburg and
Vicksburg, the memory of Fort Wagner was equally important
because it was “an equally pivotal battle”. Whether this
171
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assertion is true in the narrow military sense was and is
perhaps debatable but the significance of acknowledging black
heroism in the War was evident. The most important duty of
people at that time was, for the black writers at the Defender,
the need to remember “the cause these soldiers represented”.
This cause was not that both sides of the Civil War fought
gallantly and for equally valid principles but rather that the
Union cause represented “freedom and equality in all things
for the class of Americans whose liberty and equality were
won by that war and are now being abridged”. Unlike the
speeches and press coverage at Gettysburg, the Defender
emphasized “both races” commemorated the memory of the
black and white soldiers of the 54th Massachusetts, their leader
Colonel Robert Gould Shaw, and Governor John A. Andrew
who commissioned the unit. The celebrants laid wreaths at
Andrew‟s statue and at Shaw‟s memorial while singing hymns
such as “The Battle Hymn of the Republic” and “John
Brown‟s Body”. Even in this celebration, the reporter included
an acknowledgement of the tension in Andrew‟s begrudging
acceptance of “men who were sometimes rough and not
cultivated” into the black regiment. Still, the Defender
assessed the legacy of Fort Wagner to be proving “to the
world that the American Negro soldiers had the valor,
patriotism and courage of other American soldiers”.175
If black veterans had attended the Gettysburg reunion
in an organized way or in any substantial numbers, a
publication such as the Defender ought to have written about
it. There are simply too many reasons why Walter Blake might
have grossly misunderstood what he may or may not have
seen to base an entire argument about black veterans solely on
Hand Grips as Carol Reardon has done. The lack of
documented evidence of explicit invitations of black veterans,
the growing sense of nationalism among white Americans
embedded as it so often was with the vicious qualifying notion
of white nationalism, race relations in Gettysburg before,
during and after the reunion all strongly suggest the
improbability of the notion black veterans were either
explicitly invited to the reunion or attended on the assumption
175
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of an implicit invitation. Gettysburg in 1913 never truly
wrestled with the “negro problem”. The character of the
reunion would have been dramatically different with a few
thousand black veterans in attendance, as Carl Eeman
speculates.176 Nonetheless, this was not the case. If blacks
were present it is extremely challenging to explain the
possibility of a large amount moving about the camp without
attracting notice from someone other than Walter Blake.
Edward Linenthal‟s reflection on reunions captured the true
spirit of 1913 as it was remembered by most of its attendees.
Linenthal observed how “patriotic rhetoric on numerous
ceremonial occasions, and monument building” allowed
Northerners and Southerners “to celebrate Gettysburg as an
„American‟ victory”.177 The gallantry of each side could be
acknowledged and celebrated because it signified “a uniquely
American form of commitment to heartfelt principle” but also
because being a true and full American meant being “white”,
as that term had been defined by 1913. 178 To praise American
courage was not necessarily to imply African-Americans were
capable of real courage because courage requires agency. The
effects of reconciliation confirmed Frederick Douglass‟
trepidation about what would happen when whites clasped
“hands across the bloody chasm”. 179 This was the slogan of
the reconciliationist Horace Greely in his presidential
campaign of 1872. Fort Wagner, and Boston by extension,
was the locus of black pride in the summer of 1913, not
Gettysburg. Certainly by 1913, it seemed most white
Americans planned to write African-Americans out of
American history or only include them in a subservient status
deprived of any rational agency. In response, black people and
their relatively few white allies would become active builders
of their own historical memory, a memory which struggled for
decades to enter the mainstream of American culture.
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The Richmond Bread Riot of 1863: Class, Race, and
Gender in the Urban Confederacy
MIDN 1/C Katherine R. Titus
This morning early a few hundred women and boys
met as by concert in the Capitol Square, saying they
were hungry, and must have food. The number
continued to swell until there were more than a
thousand. But few men were among them, and these
were mostly foreign residents, with exemptions in
their pockets. About nine A.M. the mob emerged
from the western gates of the square proceeded down
Ninth Street, passing the War Department, and
crossing Main Street, increasing in magnitude at
every step, but preserving silence and (so far) good
order. Not knowing the meaning of such a
procession, I asked a pale boy where they were
going. A young woman, seemingly emaciated, but
yet with a smile, answered that they were going to
find something to eat.180
Confederate war clerk, J.B. Jones‟s description of the
Richmond Bread Riot of 1863, clearly highlights the suffering
which permeated the urban centers of the Confederacy by the
midpoint of the Civil War. The production and transportation
of goods became increasingly difficult in the war torn nation.
Inflation undermined the value of Confederate currency and
made it difficult for those on fixed wages to provide for
themselves and their families. The influx of thousands of
refugees into Richmond created a deficit of housing in the city
and raised the already inflated prices of goods. By 1863, most
citizens remarked that they found it almost impossible to feed
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themselves. As Emory M. Thomas has observed, “a nation of
farmers could indeed go hungry.”181
Although the Confederates ended 1862 militarily on a
high note with the victory at Fredericksburg in December, the
staggering casualties at Antietam and the ensuing
Emancipation Proclamation combined to create undercurrents
of doubt in the fledgling nation.182 The military‟s
181
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home front and within the army itself. Furthermore, the Union
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The Confederates were unable to take advantage of the
Union‟s disorganization following Second Manassas.
Furthermore, the Battle of Antietam did not end well for the
Army of Northern Virginia. Although the battle ended
indecisively, the South suffered a severe blow to morale
because of the high casualties and the army‟s ensuing retreat
back into Virginia. The Union pounced on the opportunity to
claim a Union victory and President Lincoln issued the
Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, 1862, a mere
five days after the battle. This only intensified the feelings of
hatred between the two sections. J.B. Jones wrote on
September 30, 1862, “Lincoln‟s proclamation was the subject
of discussion in the Senate yesterday. Some of the gravest of
our senators favor the raising of the black flag, asking and
giving no quarter hereafter,” J.B. Jones, A Rebel War Clerk’s
Diary, 159.
The Confederates made their comeback at the Battle of
Fredericksburg, December 11-15, 1862. The Confederate
troops managed to inflict massive casualties on the assaulting
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performance, however vital to the Confederacy‟s hope for
survival, did not affect the lives of the citizens on the home
front to the extent that the government‟s domestic policies
did.183 In fact, much of the Confederacy‟s legislation, passed
in the opening months of 1863, only accentuated whatever
feelings of resentment existed at the end of the previous year.
In pursuit of success on the battlefield, the Confederacy
abandoned many of the principles on which the nation had
been founded. The Richmond Bread Riot demonstrated that
Confederate domestic legislation and treasury policies
combined to create a level of discontent on the home front
which spurred people to step outside traditional notions
regarding gender roles and social norms.
Class, Race, and Gender: The Trinity of Southern Society
In order to understand the consequences and
implications of the actions taken by the women who
participated in the Richmond Bread Riot, a certain
understanding of antebellum social norms is needed. Southern
Federal troops. The Union army lost over 12,000 men and
retreated back across the Rappahannock River. The military‟s
superb performance left the morale of the army high as it
ended the 1862 campaign and went into winter quarters.
183
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dominated the minds of the home front citizens, whose
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individuals determined their role and position in society
according to race, gender, and class. Drew Gilpin Faust, one
of the foremost scholars of women in the Confederacy, notes:
White men and women of the antebellum South had
defined and understood themselves in relation to a
number of categories: race, which marked the
difference between bound and free, superior and
inferior; gender, which was designed to distinguish
independent from dependent, patriarch from
subordinate; and class, more subtle and hidden in a
society that rested within a democratizing America
but present nonetheless in distinctions of wealth,
power, education, and refinement, in claims to honor
and gentility.184
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regarding acceptable female behavior by participating in a
violent uprising and challenged the longstanding norms about
female propriety.
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Each of the three categories was intimately connected to the
other two. An assault on one category fundamentally
challenged the others as well. Thus, when the Civil War
mobilized the population and took men away from their
families, it undermined the entire Southern social system.
The War noticeably affected gender roles in Southern
society. In the antebellum era, strict notions with respect to
gender permeated Southern culture; men and women had
explicitly defined roles. Ladies were to remain uninvolved in
politics and business.185 They were also expected to be
educated, refined, and genteel. Daniel Hundley attempted to
detail the delicate dynamics of the Southern social system. He
used terms of the utmost admiration for the Southern woman
when he wrote,
Ah! thou true-hearted daughter of the sunny South,
simple and unaffected in their manners, pure in
speech as thou art in soul, and ever blessed with an
inborn grace and gentleness of spirit lovely to look
upon, fitly art thou named:
“A perfect woman, nobly planned,
To warm, to comfort, and
command;
And yet a spirit still, and bright
With something of angelic light.” 186
185
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Thus, Hundley, in the manner of most men, attributed to the
women of the South a certain divine quality and mission. This
purpose involved the support of the nation and the spiritual
development of its citizens. Hundley postulated:
When the Apostle commanded that women should
not be suffered to speak in public, but on the contrary
to content themselves with their humble household
duties, he not only spoke as the inspired servant of
God, but also as a man possessed of uncommon
common-sense. For since to the family belongs the
education and gradual elevation of the race, it is most
important that mothers should be pure, peaceable,
gentle, long-suffering and godly—which they never
can be, if permitted or inclined to enter the lists and
compete with selfish and lustful man for the prizes of
place and public emolument. 187
Both the men and women of the South accepted these
assertions. The War‟s manpower requirements, however,
undermined these norms. In the absence of men who were
consistently serving on the front, women assumed
unprecedented positions of leadership and responsibility.
In antebellum Richmond, strict notions of class also
existed. As in many of the long-established cities of the South,
the elite circle allowed for very little social mobility.
Richmonders themselves recognized the division of their
society along these class lines and the language of class
abounded in the literature, editorials, and diaries from the
antebellum period. Hundley attempted to depict the social
structure of the South in his 1860 work, Social Relations in
Our Southern States. He concluded that eight categories
existed in the South: the Southern gentleman, the middle
classes, the Southern Yankee, cotton snobs, the Southern
yeoman, the Southern bully, poor white trash, and the negro
slave. Hundley came from an elite background because of his
birth into a landholding and slave owning family in Alabama
and, consequently, he glorified the qualities of the Southern
187
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gentleman, while demeaning the middle classes, the yeomen,
and the poor whites. 188 This represented a typical upper class
perspective on other tiers of society.
Richmond possessed a unique social structure
because of its position as an industrial and manufacturing
center. Richmond was, in fact, the nation‟s largest
manufacturer of tobacco and the second largest miller of
flour.189 According to historian Virginius Dabney, “Richmond
was the industrial center of the South and the region‟s
wealthiest city, based on per capita property valuation.” 190
Further, the city was an important junction of many rail lines.
This urban and industrial character contributed to the
development of a distinctly urban class system.
Whereas in the rural environment class was based on
slave and land ownership, in Richmond membership in the
upper class was based on birth.191 According to T. C. DeLeon,
188
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1982). James Oakes analyzes the progression of American
slaveholders from the Revolutionary era to the end of the
American Civil War. He attempts to accurately portray the
upper class in the rural South while neglecting the influence of
dominant stereotypes. He also seeks to “elicit larger patterns
of political, ideological, economic, and demographic
development without doing violence to the evidence of
diversity within the slaveholding class” (see page ix). The
Ruling Race remains the authoritative work on the upper class
in the antebellum and wartime era of the South
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“In the country districts habit and condescension often
overrode class barriers, but in the city, where class sometimes
jostled privilege, the line of demarcation was so strongly
drawn that its overstepping was dangerous.” 192 DeLeon also
believed that class determination was based almost solely on
familial standing, rather than entrepreneurial endeavors. He
wrote,
Trade, progressive spirit and self-made personality
were excluded from the plane of the elect, as though
germiniferous. The “sacred soil” and the sacred
social circle were paralleled in the minds of their
possessors.193
Hundley also observed the rigidity of the Southern class
structure. With regard to the members of the upper class, he
concluded, “Indeed, to state the matter fairly, he comes
usually of aristocratic parentage; for family pride prevails to a
greater extent in the South than in the North.” 194
This elite, urban class prided itself on its refinement
and high standards, which hailed back to the earliest days of
Southern settlement. Hundley described the Southern
slaves…The majority of slaves were held by the one-fifth of
slaveholders who owned twenty or more bondsmen” (see page
36). Thus, the South possessed a distinct class of people who
appeared to be much better off than the majority of citizens.
This class system dominated not only social interactions, but
politics and occupations as well. In this rural setting, the class
system was not entirely insurmountable. Social standing was
based on possession of land and slaves and, thus, anyone with
an entrepreneurial spirit could buy their way into the upper
class. Oakes writes that most Southerners in the west and in
rural settings expected to own slaves and land, even if they
arrived with little or no property. That expectation was
feasible (see page 41). Conversely, rich planters could sink
into poverty if they mismanaged their estates.
192
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gentleman as a man of the highest education, manners, and
generosity. These individuals were articulate and maintained
an active interest in world affairs and their communities. 195
The rigidity of the class structure was such that even Mrs.
Jefferson Davis, the first lady of the Confederacy, was never
fully accepted into Richmond‟s elite circle. Mary Boykin
Chesnut, one of the best known ladies of the Southern upper
class, commented that “Mrs. Davis and Jeff Davis proved
themselves anything but <well-bred by their talk>.”196 Mary
Chesnut was herself not a Richmond native. She and her
husband moved from South Carolina to the capital after her
husband became an aide to President Jefferson Davis.197 Mrs.
Chesnut was accepted into the Richmond elite only because
she was a prominent member of the South Carolina upper
class. The elite of well-established eastern cities were more
acceptable in Richmond than those individuals from the West.
Mississippi, Texas, and the rural areas of Louisiana were still
considered, in many cases, the frontier regions. Thus, the long
established elite of Richmond considered even the wealthy or
landed elite from the west unequal.
Conceptions of class also carried into the physical
division of Richmond. Richmond was a city of several hills:
Union, Church, Oregon, Council Chamber, Shockoe,
Gamble‟s, and Navy.198 The upper class lived in certain areas
of the city, specifically on Marshall, Cary, Franklin, and Grace
Streets. Mary Wingfield Scott wrote, “By 1850 Grace and
Franklin were already the handsomest streets in Richmond and
certainly the most sought after by wealth and fashion.” 199 The
lower classes tended to live near Union, Church, and Shockoe
Hills. Location had much to do with the class composition of
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the neighborhoods. Scott noted that the Tredegar Ironworks,
located near Oregon Hill, had a distinct interest in maintaining
housing near the factory. She asserted, “So far as we know,
the Tredegar Iron Works had no actual financial part in the
development of Oregon Hill. But it needed workmen‟s homes
within walking distance.”200 Thus, Richmond was not only
divided by class in terms of society, but also along physical
location.
This traditional class system worked with
surprisingly few episodes of lower class discontent in the
antebellum era. Whereas in the North, class based riots
erupted fairly frequently, no riots of this kind surfaced in the
South.201 In his analysis of American riots in the antebellum
era, historian David Grimstead concludes that different
patterns of riots existed in the North and South. Many riots
and mobs did erupt in the South; however, they were often
based on racial fears. Grimstead writes, “Of the 403 Southern
riots, about 66 percent fall into three distinctively Southern
categories: mob punishment of alleged criminals (68);
insurrection scare mobs (35); and mobs against those labeled
200
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abolitionist, although usually there was no evidence of
abolition activity (162).”202 Thus, although Southerners
incorrectly asserted that their society did not experience any
episodes of violent outburst, they accurately noted that few
instances of class-based insurrections erupted in the seemingly
harmonious antebellum era.
Many scholars argue that the contentedness of the
lower classes revolved around the third category of the
Southern social system: race. The existence of black slaves
meant that those individuals occupied the lowest class of
society. This automatically elevated the social position of even
the poorest of whites in the South. Scholars dub this concept
Herrenvolk Democracy.203 Although Hundley was not familiar
with the term, he described the lower classes‟ support for
slavery in almost identical language:
Were you situated as the Southern Yeomen are—
humble in worldly position, patient delvers in the
soil, daily earning your bread by the toilsome sweat
of your own brows—would you be pleased to see
four millions of inferior blacks suddenly raised from
a position of equality with yourselves?204
The lower class whites were relatively content with their
position because, regardless of whether they were poor or
yeomen, they were never considered the dregs of society. That
classification was reserved for blacks alone. Consequently, the
elite of the South were an aristocracy based fundamentally on
race.
Richmond‟s antebellum conceptions of class, race,
and gender proved unable to stand the stresses of war. War
magnified the disparity between the upper and lower classes
because it undermined the three fundamental components of
the seemingly harmonious society and required women to step
202

David Grimstead, American Mobbing, 1828-1861: Toward
Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 101.
203
George M. Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White
Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny,
1817-1914 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), 68.
204
Hundley, Social Relations In Our Southern States, 219.

96

into roles which previously had been unacceptable. In the face
of starvation and the loss of loved ones on the battlefield, the
poor, able in the antebellum years to accept their lower status,
refused to tolerate the privileges that the upper class seemed to
enjoy. They demonstrated their willingness to defy convention
by taking drastic action in the Richmond Bread Riot.
Confederate Domestic Legislation: 1861-1863
The Confederate government, overwhelmingly
composed of elite members (see Table 1), produced legislation
which accentuated the feelings of lower class resentment. The
first signs of discontent emerged as a result of the first
Confederate Conscription Act, passed on April 16, 1862. The
loss of every major battle in the West, combined with the loss
of the major southern port city, New Orleans, served to
convince the Confederate Congress of the necessity of a
slightly more drastic solution. From the first days of secession,
the South had been at a serious disadvantage in terms of
manpower, and although Southerners voluntarily enlisted in
impressive numbers, by 1862, the number of soldiers fit for
duty did not meet the required criteria. The government‟s
solution, the Conscription Act, mandated “all persons residing
within the Confederate States, between the ages of 18 and 35
years, and rightfully subject to military duty, shall be held to
be in the military service of the Confederate states…”205 In
September, Congress expanded the act to the ages of 18 to 45.
The drafts served mostly to arouse fear of military
despotism in the South. Many citizens believed the draft
conflicted “with the individualistic instincts of Southerners
and with their conceptions of genuine manhood.”206 Voluntary
enlistment, they contended, was the height of fulfilling one‟s
duty to country. Hence, the draft conveyed to many a sense of
cowardice. Loyal citizens held that the government‟s
utilization of a draft only proved its lack of faith in the honor
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of its people. Furthermore, several prominent men believed
that the act violated the Confederate Constitution. Vice
President Alexander Stephens and Governor Joseph Brown of
Georgia were among the most prominent dissidents. They
protested that the act violated the rights of the states. Although
the drafts evoked significant resentment, the ensuing
amendments prompted harsher accusations of class bias.
The policy of substitution, approved by the
Conscription Act, allowed anyone to purchase a substitute to
serve in place of one drafted to serve. The availability of this
option gave the distinct impression of government favoritism.
Although the Confederate government‟s intention was “to
utilize the potentialities of men along industrial lines,”207 most
Southern citizens could not afford to procure a substitute and
were, therefore, obligated to serve when conscripted.
Substitutes were often offered over $4,000, a sum which, in
the war torn south, only the wealthiest citizens could pay.208
The government‟s refusal to regulate or alter the policy of
substitution only fueled the claim that the war had evolved
into “a rich man‟s war and a poor man‟s fight.” 209
The first amendment to the draft, the “class
exemption” system, also generated significant resentment
among the people. This amendment allowed men of certain
occupations to evade the draft. These occupations included
“national and state officers, railroad employees, druggists,
professors, schoolteachers, miners, ministers, pilots, nurses,
and iron-furnace and foundry laborers.”210 Many citizens who
could not escape the draft and were unable to procure an
exemption believed that the amendment served only to shield
those too cowardly to enter the service. Historian Stephen
Ambrose believed that the exemption acts actually
undermined the Confederate war effort because they
highlighted the inequality within the legislation. He wrote,
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The „Scarsity [sic] of Men‟ was indeed a major
problem for the yeomen. Men were needed to raise
crops, protect the families, from unfair governmental
levies, and to ward off roving raiders from both
armies. But although the Confederate Congress was
willing to exempt large numbers from conscription,
small farmers were not among the privileged
group.211
Congress‟s approval of these exemptions fueled the discontent
which emerged as a result of conscription and the perception
of an unequal burden of service became more prevalent among
the lower classes.
By far the most hated amendment was the “Twenty
Negro Act,” passed in October of 1862, which exempted
“owners or overseers of twenty or more slaves.” 212 The act
exhibited blatant class favoritism because in the rural South,
ownership of twenty or more slaves constituted planter status.
The majority of Southerners did not own twenty slaves; many
did not own any slaves at all. Although Congress passed the
exemption in hopes of stimulating food and crop production, it
served mainly to aggravate the class resentment which had
been growing slowly. The outcry of the poor grew louder
against the perceived inequality of sacrifice.
Also augmenting the poor‟s disapproval of class
based legislation were the currency issues which plagued the
Confederacy throughout its existence. Eventually, the shock of
the Federal blockade of the Southern coasts contributed to a
notable reduction in the supply of goods which were produced
outside the South.213 Eugene Lerner asserts, “The blockade
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was felt in every corner of the southern economy.” 214 Many of
the luxury items which citizens were used to enjoying on a
regular basis became almost impossible to find. Likewise,
necessities such as coffee, salt, and paper became difficult to
procure.
Southern exports also declined significantly because
of the blockade. Lerner writes, “As the war continued, the
invading Union armies, the northern blockade, and the
reallocation of southern labor tended to reduce output.” 215 The
war effort became the primary focus of the fledgling nation
and it mobilized all of its forces for the pursuant military
effort. This made it extremely difficult to maintain the pre-war
levels of production, and therefore, profit decreased.
The Confederacy‟s own financial mismanagement
compounded the nation‟s problems with supply. Generally,
Southerners and nineteenth century Americans abhorred
taxation. Any tax mandated at the national level directly
contradicted the policy of state rights and impinged upon
individuals rights. Although the Confederate Secretary of the
Treasury, Christopher G. Memminger, promoted taxation as
the most effective means of raising money for the war effort,
he never managed to convince either the people or President
Jefferson Davis of its necessity. He did, however, persuade
Congress to pass a tax law in April of 1863. This law
Levied a license tax on just about every form of
occupation or business, a graduated income tax
whose scale varied from 1 percent of incomes less
than $500 to 15 percent of incomes over $10,000, and
a tax-in-kind tithe on agricultural produce and
livestock: 10 percent of everything grown or
slaughtered in 1863.216
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The Tax-in-Kind affected almost the entire Southern
population, but its enforcement varied significantly from
region to region; the collectors often abused their
responsibilities and took more than the law mandated. Many
citizens believed the Confederate government had far outstepped its bounds. Taxation, they contended, was under the
jurisdiction of the states. That Congress passed a national act
of such scope convinced many Southerners that the
government had, by 1863, abandoned many of the principles
that had originally justified secession.
Because of this dedication to state rights and
individual liberties, the Confederacy funded its war effort
primarily by issuing treasury notes and loans. Often, the
government did not collect on its loans, and the Treasury
Department flooded the economy with empty treasury notes.
Confederate currency became valueless. After conducting
extensive statistical research, one scholar has concluded that
“for thirty-one consecutive months, from October, 1861, to
March, 1864, the general price index of the Confederacy rose
at an almost constant rate of 10 per cent a month.” 217 Yet,
while inflation increased rapidly, the issue of treasury notes
did not cease. Instead, the government continued to produce
the valueless notes. The Confederacy based these notes on the
anticipated money to be made by selling cotton to Europe.
Emory Thomas postulates, “Beyond the limited amount of
specie, estimated at $27 million, and the uncertain potential of
cotton, the Confederacy had little in the way of economic
resources, hence its reliance on fiat money and popular faith in
its domestic economy.”218 As the war progressed, that faith
decreased drastically.
A notable aspect of Southern inflation is the fact the
wages increased disproportionately to inflation. After studying
wage quotations and account books from large Southern firms,
one economist concluded, “the average wage increased
approximately ten times during the four years of the war, or at
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a rate of 4.6 per cent a month.”219 This increase was less than
half of the price index (percentage) increase. Citizens on fixed
wages felt the brunt of this reality. T.C. DeLeon noted the
disparity in his journal:
The pinch began to be felt by many who had never
known it before; and almost every one, who had any
surplus portables, was willing to turn them into
money. In this way, those who had anything to sell,
for the time managed to live. But the unfortunates
who had only what they needed absolutely, or who
were forced to live upon a fixed stipend, that did not
increase in any ratio to the decrease of money,
suffered terribly.220
An analysis of one of the major firms in Richmond, the
Tredegar Iron Works, also displays the inadequate increase in
fixed wages. Historian Charles Dew, the authority on
Tredegar, writes:
The Tredegar provided a small increase to $4.50 in
January 1863. These advances did not begin to cover
the rise in the cost of living in the Confederate
capital, however. By the beginning of 1863, Tredegar
wages were up only 80 per cent over antebellum
levels while the general price index for the eastern
Confederacy had risen to seven times the level of the
first four months of 1861.221
These low wage workers in Richmond were unable to provide
for themselves or their families. Their suffering contributed to
the growing cynicism about the Confederate government‟s
inability to adequately support its citizens.
219

Lerner, “Money, Prices, and Wages in the Confederacy,”
32.
220
T.C. DeLeon, Four Years in Rebel Capitals: An Inside
View of Life in the Southern Confederacy, From Birth To
Death (Mobile: Gossip Print Co., 1890), 236.
221
Charles B. Dew, Ironmaker to the Confederacy: Joseph R.
Anderson and the Tredegar Iron Works (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1966), 239.

102

The presence of citizens willing to take advantage of
the financial chaos only added to the people‟s frustration with
the Confederacy‟s deteriorating fiscal situation. Many citizens
saw the potential for profit in the economic uncertainty of the
South. These people, deemed speculators, bought goods and
hoarded them. They took merchandise off of the market and
drove prices still higher. Many Southerners used the
speculators as scapegoats and blamed all of the Confederacy‟s
economic problems on these “wicked” individuals. The
Richmond Dispatch attributed the price increase specifically to
the speculators, whom the paper referred to as “those pests of
society.”222 One article laid out two tables comparing prices
for basic items in 1860 to the cost of the same items in 1863
(see Table 2). It read, “So much we owe the speculators, who
have staid [sic] at home to prey upon the necessities of their
fellow citizens.”223 Despite the animosity toward speculators
which permeated all of Southern society, their activities did
not contribute to the financial problems to the extent that
inflation did.
Impressment also aroused a great deal of discontent
in the Confederacy. On March 26, 1863, Congress approved
an “act to regulate impressments.” The act stated:
“impressments of forage or other property authorized, when
necessary for the army. Value thereof to be determined by
appraisement.”224 The War Department created a standard
price for common items; these prices, however, were often
well below the market price. The act even allowed for the
impressment of slaves. Because slaves fell into the category of
“other property,” they could be seized at any time in the name
of military necessity. This irked many citizens, especially
because many of these Southerners had supported secession
on the basis of the sanctity of private property. Thus, many
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farmers and merchants came to fear an encounter with a
government impressment agent as much or more than Union
invasion.
The Impressment Act also required that merchants
possessed a passport to either enter or leave the cities. These
passports were often difficult to attain. The Richmond
Enquirer reported:
The owners of a number of country carts that used to
bring supplies to this market have of late ceased to
come, though the markets are destitute of vegetables
common to the season. As many carts as formerly
start for the city, but many now stop before reaching
their destination, haul up at some convenient place by
the roadside, sell their goods and put for home
instantly. The market men allege, with show of
justice, we presume, that when they come into the
city, they are bothered half out of their wits to get out
again. When applying for a passport, they have to
produce somebody who knows them, as a voucher, a
thing not easy to do. Then, again they say they are
stopped on every corner of the street and subjected to
cross questioning by the military guard whose
importunities are not always to be resisted.”225
Thus, the Confederacy‟s problem, in some instances, was not
a deficiency of supply, but a paucity of policy. The continued
enforcement of offensive legislation sustained public criticism
of the government. Moreover, a large proportion of the
population wondered why the government refused to amend
policies which so obviously added to the suffering in crowded
urban centers. Many reached the conclusion that the
government had abandoned its responsibilities, especially to
those least able to provide for themselves. Essentially, the
Confederacy abdicated its duty to the home front in pursuit of
military success.
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Richmond: Spring, 1863
The city of Richmond itself changed significantly
because of wartime stresses. The rapid increase in the
population compounded the problems of food supply, housing,
and inflation. The city had a population of approximately
38,000 in 1860.226 However, after Richmond‟s selection as
capital of the Confederacy, it attracted an abundance of
visitors and new residents and the population of Richmond
doubled only a year after secession: by 1863, the population
had reached 100,000 inhabitants.227 Midori Takagi believes
that the bulk of the population was due to the influx of
Confederate soldiers; at least ten to fifteen thousand troops
traveled to Richmond rapidly after its designation as the
Confederate capital.228 The swollen population, however, did
not return to normal after the departure of the troops. Refugees
moved to Richmond from everywhere in the South
(specifically from Maryland and rural areas of Virginia) due to
the city‟s abundance of both government and industrial
employment opportunities. In addition, Richmond‟s
designation as one of the prominent social centers attracted
foreigners and job seekers. Thus, historian Mary Elizabeth
Massey contends that Richmond remained the most crowded
city in the South for the duration of the war. 229
The availability of housing did not increase at a rate
which corresponded to the population increase. As early as
1862, residents noted the dearth of space for newcomers.
Judith McGuire, a refugee searching for lodgings in
Richmond, found it almost impossible to find a place to stay in
February, 1862. She remarked, “The city is overrun with
members of Congress, Government officers, office-seekers,
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and strangers generally. Main Street is as crowded as
Broadway, New York; it is said that every boarding house is
full.”230 The next day she wrote, “I do not believe there is a
vacant spot in the city.”231 McGuire‟s statements were not an
exaggeration: housing was extremely scarce and demand was
high. Prices for boarding soared to extreme levels. The City
Council echoed McGuire‟s sentiments. It noted in February,
1863, that rent had quadrupled in the years since the war
erupted.232 Many worried they would not be able to continue
to pay the required fees. Margaret Brown Wight expressed her
relief at receiving a letter containing money from her husband
who was in the army:
A letter came from John enclosing $15 which was
handed him by a gentleman, saying it was money put
in his hands for me, that John must ask no questions
about it, he could only tell him it was for me…It is
certainly respectable for we have not enough to pay
for our own board much less supply ourselves with
necessary clothing.233
Wight‟s appreciation for such a small sum shows that
previously well-established citizens, like Margaret Wight and
Judith McGuire, worried that they could no longer support
themselves or their families. By early 1863, many urban
Southerners concurred with J. B. Jones‟s assertion: “How we,
„the people,‟ are to live is a thought of serious concern.” 234
Other notable problems also arose as a result of the
population increase. Crime rates skyrocketed; gambling, gang
activity, prostitution, thievery, and murder all permeated the
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Confederate capital. Women moved into the work force in
unprecedented numbers. The war and its effects overturned
both antebellum standards of behavior and the accepted social
order.
One example of this change was the evolution of
prostitution in Richmond. In the antebellum era, prostitutes
kept to themselves and practiced their trade discreetly in order
to avoid severe social stricture and prosecution. One scholar
writes, “On the eve of the Civil War…Richmond prostitution
could be characterized as a relatively invisible occupation.” 235
The prevalence of soldiers, isolated from their families and
looking for female companionship, changed that “invisible
occupation” into a commonplace career in wartime Richmond.
Historian Catherine Clinton notes, “The Civil War created the
largest increase in the sex trade in nineteenth-century
America, perhaps the largest growth spurt in the nation‟s
history.”236 As the war progressed, these women, secure in
their numbers, ventured unashamedly into unfamiliar territory,
and alarmed many of the more conventional citizens. The
Richmond Daily Dispatch noted the unprecedented behavior
and complained,
It has been well known for some time past that
cyprians, resident and accumulated since the removal
of the seat of Government to this place, as well as
loose males of the most abandoned character from
other parts of the Confederacy, have been disporting
themselves extensively on the sidewalks and in
hacks, open carriages, &c., in the streets of
Richmond, to the amazement of sober-sided citizens
compelled to smell the odors which they exude, and
witness the impudence and familiar vulgarity of
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many of the stime [sic] faced of the prostitutes of
both sexes.”237
The distinction between “respectable” ladies of Richmond and
the “unmentionables” blurred as wartime stresses necessitated
the drastic increase in working women.
Children‟s gangs also presented a significant
challenge to the local and state governments. The gangs had
existed prior to the outbreak of the war, and as one local
noted, “There never was such a place as Richmond for
fighting among small boys…the boys of particular localities
associated in fighting bands…there were the Shockoe Hill
Cats, the Church Hill Cats, the Basin Cats, the Oregon Hill
Cats, the Navy Hill Cats, etc.”238 The absence of active
parental figures produced predictable results: the frequency of
violence increased. Attempts to quell this gang activity had
little effect. Even President Jefferson Davis had an
unsuccessful encounter with the “Hill Cats” and the “Butcher
Cats.” The Davis‟s young black servant boy was beaten while
attempting to negotiate with the children of the gangs. The
President, upset about the violence, tried to reprimand the
gang members. His speech had no effect, and the hostility
continued. These gangs and their complete lack of respect for
authority showed the extent to which crime had permeated the
wartime city of Richmond.
The weather in the winter and spring of 1863 only
compounded the problem of morale in the city. The weather
cut supply to the city off almost entirely. Throughout
February, March, and April, Virginia sustained heavy storms
of both snow and rain. Almost every diarist noted the severe
weather. One Richmonder, Herbert Augustine Claiborne, as
did many other diarists during the Civil War, dutifully
recorded the temperature and weather conditions for every day
of 1863. According to his notes, over half of the days in
March and February brought heavy rain or snow. The snow
was over eight inches deep on March 21. The warm weather
in the opening days of April melted the snow rapidly.
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Although at the outset, the warmth may have seemed a
welcome relief, in fact, it created vast problems for supply. 239
The unusually wet, spring weather had already
saturated the dirt roads leading to Richmond. The rain, in
conjunction with the preponderance of melting snow, made
the roads an impassable mud trap for those attempting to
deliver supplies into the city. Margaret Wight mused about the
effects of the weather and wrote about her fears of starvation.
She concluded that the spring of 1863 brought “The gloomiest
state of weather I ever saw.”240 Robert Garlick Hill Kean, head
of the Confederate Bureau of War, made similar observations.
He noted, “High water and deep mud will be the consequences
which will postpone military operations until in April.”241 The
unusual weather was also a common subject in the
newspapers. The Richmond Dispatch reported, “The supply of
vegetables, poultry, fish, and butchers' meat, have all been cut
short by the difficulty experienced in making headway against
the acres of mud and slush encountered in the attempt to get to
Richmond.” These sources all display the serious concern
evoked by the further decrease in supply due to the dreadful
weather conditions. The price of necessary items in
Richmond, already remarkably high on account of inflation,
speculation, and impressment, rose dramatically.
An explosion in one of the Confederate Ordnance
Department‟s laboratories added to the unrest among the
working class in the capital throughout the spring of 1863. On
March 13, over 69 women and children were killed or injured
in an explosion at the laboratory on Brown‟s Island, in the
James River, at Richmond. According to the Chief of the
Ordnance Department, Josiah Gorgas, “The accident was
239
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caused by the ignition of a friction primer. The primer stuck
on the varnishing board and [Mary Ryan] struck the board
three times very hard on the table to drive out the primer.” 242
The first explosion caused a chain of explosions due to the
presence of an excess of combustible material. Initially, over
40 people died, but the numbers rose significantly each day as
the injured expired from serious burns. Gorgas had few words
of condolence for the casualties, focusing instead on his
admiration for his wife: “Mamma has been untiring,” he
wrote, “in aiding visiting & relieving these poor sufferers, &
has fatigued herself very much. She has done an infinite deal
of good to these poor people.”243
Local resentment increased as a result of the
government‟s failure to provide safe conditions for these
women and children. The casualties were consistently referred
to in terms reminiscent of female helplessness. The Richmond
Daily Dispatch called the victims, “poor creatures,” and J.B.
Jones accurately dubbed them “little indigent girls.” These
women and children made only meager wages, which “varied
from $1.50 to 2.40”244 per day. The over 300 women and
children whom the laboratory employed continued to work
although their salary was insufficient to provide them with the
means to procure food for their families. Yet, these workers
could not hope for better paying jobs because they were
largely illiterate.
Contrast the experience of the Ordnance Department
workers with that of the women who worked for the
Confederate Treasury Department. The so-called “Treasury
Girls” signed thousands of worthless Confederate treasury
notes and bonds each day and they earned as much as $65 a
month for their work. The applications for the relatively few
positions arrived at the department in astounding numbers.
Consequently, the positions were extremely competitive.
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Literacy was an obvious requirement, and it automatically
precluded many poor women from the office. Similarly,
employment depended upon social standing. Many members
of the lower strata of society viewed the distinction with
disdain. One woman wrote,
Why is it that … poor women engaged in a perilous
and hazardous occupation … are denied a living
compensation for their labour, when so many of the
departments are filled with young ladies (not
dependent on their pay) with nothing to do, at salaries
equal to and in some cases better than the best male
clerks in the different departments? 245
The explosion at Brown‟s Island only highlighted the
dangers associated with many lower class professions. It
illuminated the inequalities related to employment
opportunities and hazards. Consequently, many citizens
believed their needs and safety were not a significant concern
to their employers or to the Confederate government.
The Richmond Bread Riot
On the evening of April 1, 1863, a group of women
met at Belvidere Hill Baptist Church in Richmond. The church
was located on Church Street in Oregon Hill, a notably
working class section of the city. 246 The women resolved to
gather the next morning in order to demand food at
government prices from Virginia Governor John Letcher. Mrs.
Burton Harrison, a Richmond resident, described the mob as
comprised mostly by “women and children of the poorer
class.”247 As evidence of the working class nature of the
participants, one of the leaders, Mary Jackson, was employed
as a huckster and another participant, Barbara Idoll, made
tents for a living. Additionally, although most women came
from the neighborhoods of Oregon Hill, Sydney and
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Penitentiary Bottom, and Sheep Hill, some women traveled
from the outskirts of the city in order to attend the meeting. 248
The next morning, April 2, 1863, these frustrated
women gathered as planned in Capitol Square, near the
Governor‟s mansion. They demanded to speak to Governor
Letcher. Instead, they were met by Colonel S. Bassett French,
a member of the Governor‟s staff. He seemed reluctant to
speak to the women, and informed them that the Governor had
already left for work at the Capitol. Many of the leaders
248
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immediately approached the Capitol building. As the crowd
increased in both magnitude and riotous intention, the
Governor eventually appeared in Capitol Square and
addressed them. He informed the women that it was
impossible for him to mandate that goods be sold at
government prices. Angered by Governor Letcher‟s words, the
women rushed out of Capitol Square and toward the business
district. The group rapidly transformed into an angry mob of
rioters. Most carried weapons, which ranged from clubs and
axes to knives and pistols. They began looting stores on both
Main and Cary Streets, and seized as many goods as they
could manage to carry on their person or load into the carts
they stole along the way.249
As the rioters proceeded down Main and Cary
Streets, spectators joined in the looting and many who heard
the disturbance went out into the streets to investigate. Local
thoroughfares became so crowded, it was impossible to
determine the actual number of rioters; hence, conflicting
reports about the size of the mob emerged. William Walter
Cleary estimated that the crowd numbered “7 or 800 women
aided by a few men.”250 Catherine Ann Devereux wrote she
heard “that the riot in Richmond was more serious than we
supposed, 20,000 persons assembled in the streets.”251 It is
possible that 20,000 people were present in the streets at the
time of the riots. The population increase in Richmond had
crowded the city with more inhabitants than it could contain.
The average estimate, however, and the most likely
approximation, neared 5500 participants. 252
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As rioting continued on Main Street, city officials
took decisive action. Richmond‟s mayor, Joseph Mayo,
addressed the crowd on Cary Street and read the Riot Act. His
words had little effect, and the rioting persisted on both Main
and Cary Streets. As the mob grew, the violence increased.
According to historian Michael Chesson, the women
targeted both supposed speculators and government agencies:
“Some of the looters continued down Cary, breaking into a
Confederate commissary and into another government
warehouse.”253 Other stores looted included bakeries, shoe
stores, grocery stores, and jewelry stores. Many Richmond
citizens believed that a significant number of the city
merchants had procured draft exemptions out of cowardice
and in order to make profits. Business was indeed profitable
for those who remained in operation throughout the War.
Richmond citizens also targeted foreigners and Jews.
The city had a tradition of blatant anti-Semitism. Once the
War erupted, many Richmond citizens openly blamed the
Jews and foreigners in the city for speculation and charged
them with disloyalty.254 Sallie A. Putnam, for instance,
believed that the Jews in Richmond profited from the war. She
exhorted, “They were not found, as the more interested of the
people, without the means to purchase food when the
Confederate money became useless to us from the failure of
our cause.”255 Major John W. Daniel contended that local
stereotypes allowed the rioters to target Richmond Jews.
After the War, he reminisced, “certain people down there were
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credited with great wealth. It was said that they had made
barrels of money out of the Confederacy, and the female
Communists went at them without a qualm of conscience.” 256
According to the Richmond City Council minutes,
the rioters actually did significant damage to several
businesses they targeted. On April 13, the council noted,
“Accounts for the property taken by the late rioters in this
City, one in the name of J. T. Hicks amounting to the sum of
$13,530.00 and one in the name of Tyler & Son amounting to
the sum of $6,467.55, were laid before the Council and
referred to the Committee on Claims.” 257 Several instances of
violence also occurred. Eyewitness Hal Tutwiler wrote,
One woman knocked out a pane of glass out of a
shop window, of which the door was fastened, & put
her arm in to steal something, but the shopman cut all
four of her fingers off. I was right in the middle of the
row all the time, it was the most horrible sight I ever
saw…258
The New York Herald also reported a bloody
encounter between the women and those attempting to pacify
them. In its April 11th report, the Herald read, “A few
individuals attempted to resist the women, but without
success. One man who struck a female was wounded in the
shoulder by a shot from a revolver, and the threatening attitude
of those armed with hatchets, &c. intimidated others from
attempting force.”259 For the most part, however, the women
damaged property, but harmed few individuals.
Government officials‟ attempts to put a stop to the
riot continued. After the Mayor appeared, the next public
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official to approach the rioters was Governor John Letcher.
Most primary accounts attribute Letcher to calling out the
Richmond Public Guard. According to Chesson, the primary
responsibility of the Public Guard was the defense of
important institutions in Richmond, notably the “Capitol and
Capitol Square and the state (now Confederate) armory and
penitentiary in the western part of the city.” 260 Although
Lieutenant Edward Scott Gay was the commander in charge at
the time of the riot, the Public Guard ultimately reported to the
Virginia Governor. According to many accounts, the Governor
ordered the women to disperse. When they refused to comply,
he threatened to order the Public Guard to shoot into the
crowd. War clerk J.B. Jones recorded,
Thus the work of spoliation went on, until the
military appeared upon the scene, summoned by Gov.
Letcher, whose term of service is near its close. He
had the Riot Act read (by the mayor), and then
threatened to fire on the mob. He gave them five
minutes‟ time to disperse in, threatening to use
military force (the city battalion being present) if they
did not comply with the demand.261
Other eyewitnesses, including Judith McGuire, Sallie Putnam,
Sara A. Pryor, Hal Tutwiler, and Ernest Taylor Walthall all
gave the credit to the Governor.
Letcher‟s aide at the time, Colonel French, believed
that his former employer was not only influential, but solely
responsible for taking drastic action in order to save the city.
In 1878, in response to renewed attention on the Bread Riot,
he wrote to Letcher, “If Mr. Davis attempted to quell the mob
I was not witness to it, nor did I over hear of it, until I read it
in the paper you sent me; that you did quell it by decisive
measures you threatened is beyond dispute.” 262 As Governor,
it is logical that Letcher called out the Public Guard and had
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the authority to issue the five minute ultimatum; however,
many eyewitnesses credited Confederate President Jefferson
Davis with calling out the Public Guard.
Most scholars believe Jefferson Davis also addressed
the mob. While some accounts seem to depict Letcher as
primarily responsible for dispersing the crowd, others, notably
Varina Davis‟s biography of her husband, actually portray the
President as primarily responsible for the dissolution of the
riot. Varina Davis wrote:
He concluded by saying: “You say you are hungry
and have no money. Here is all I have; it is not much,
but take it.” He then, emptying his pockets, threw all
the money they contained among the mob, after
which he took out his watch and said: “We do not
desire to injure anyone, but this lawlessness must
stop. I will give you five minutes to disperse,
otherwise you will be fired on.”263
Her account, however, is unique in its crediting Davis. Most
journals and letters portray Davis giving a compassionate
speech to the rioters, rather than taking a definitive military
stance. Sara Pryor‟s friend, “Agnes,” wrote Sara a letter which
depicted the president as sympathetic and deeply moving in
his speech. “The President then appeared,” Agnes recalled,
“ascended a dray, and addressed them. It is said he was
received at first with hisses from the boys, but after he had
spoken some little time with great kindness and sympathy, the
women quietly moved on, taking their food with them.” 264
Other officials of lesser importance also appeared on
the scene and took measures to end the riot. According to his
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wife, Colonel John B. Baldwin, a Confederate congressman,
was actually responsible for suppressing the mob. In her
account, Colonel Baldwin rushed toward the riot and “made
another ernest [sic] appeal to them promising to do all in his
power to aid those who were in want.”265 According to this
portrayal, by the time the Mayor and Governor addressed the
crowd, Baldwin had already dispersed the rioters.
There is no doubt that several government officials
addressed the crowd at different points during the Richmond
Bread Riot. The mob was so extensive that different
individuals may have subdued the crowds in different
locations. Mrs. Burton Harrison believed that “President
Davis, Governor Letcher, General Elzey, and General Winder,
with Mr. Seddon, Secretary of War” all appeared on the scene
and spoke to the rioters. 266 Similarly, the Richmond City
Council counted all officials equally responsible for
dissipating the mob. During the special session on April 2,
called in response to the bread riot, the Council resolved,
that the Council do tender their thanks and gratitude
to President Davis, Governor Letcher, Mayor Mayo,
and Honorable John B. Baldwin, for their timely and
appropriate addresses and exertions during the
continuance of this disgraceful affair, and by which
the Council believe it was more speedily quieted. 267
The different accounts make it impossible to
determine which individual was primarily responsible for the
ultimate quelling of the riot. The common denominator
throughout the evidence is that many public officials found
their appeals to the crowd unsuccessful and hence, they were
forced to resort to threats of violence in order to subdue the
masses. The riot destroyed the façade of class harmony, and
the elite found their influence over the poor significantly
reduced.
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After the crowd finally dispersed, the Richmond
police force quickly proceeded to arrest known and suspected
participants. The threat of riot remained even after the crowd
dissipated. Many eyewitnesses noted the formation of unruly
women on the morning after the riot, April 3 rd. Herbert
Augustine Claiborne reported, “Riotous Spirit again
manifested to day. Several women gathered. Doubtful whether
the spirit assunder [sic] will cease until blood is shed. The
government will do it if necessary. The actual suffering used
by the rioters is a pretext.”268 Others reported that the women
attempted to resume rioting. On April 3, John Waring wrote,
“The women started to brake [sic] in a store this morning but
the officers stopped them.”269 However, the Richmond City
Council and the Confederate government took several steps to
prevent the outbreak of any riots in the future. The councilmen
placed cannon on Main Street and called Confederate troops
into Richmond.270 Ultimately, the authorities arrested fortythree women and twenty-five men.271 These individuals stood
trial in the Richmond Hustings Court throughout the months
of April and May 1863.
In the aftermath of the riot, the Confederate Secretary
of War, James A. Seddon, issued a notice ordering the
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suppression of all public reports concerning the riot. 272 The
government and the local elite believed reports of the riot
would allow the Northern press to exaggerate accounts of
suffering on the Southern home front. Catherine Edmondston
elaborated on common perceptions of the Northern press:
“Their hope now is to starve us out. They think we are
suffering, ignore the fact of the depreciation of our currency,
& quote the high price of provisions to prove it, [they] are
jubilant over some mobs & riots which they call „bread
riots.‟”273 Thus, the day after the riot, April 3, J.B. Jones
recorded, “No account of yesterday‟s riot appeared in the
papers to-day [sic], for obvious reasons.”274 He was slightly
mistaken. The first report appeared in the Richmond Examiner
on April 3. In some respects, this account was not surprising
given the editor‟s open anti-administration position. On the
other hand, the Richmond Enquirer, Sentinel, Dispatch, and
Whig complied with the government‟s request not to print
articles related to the riot.275 Those dailies did, however,
publish accounts of the riot once the trials began.
The local press and diary portrayals of the riot
conveyed a markedly biased tone against the rioters. Almost
all of the diarists who included descriptions of the Bread Riot
believed many citizens in Richmond suffered, but they did not
think the riot participants were actually desperate for food.
William Walter Cleary noted, “while provisions are scarce and
prices high there is no doubt much suffering by the poor—the
persons engaged in this were not poor or starving—but were
actuated by motives of plunder, dry goods, jewelry, and Fancy
goods seeming to be the objects of their Robbery.” 276 Margaret
Brown Wight also suspected the rioters had ulterior motives:
272
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“The worthy women among the poorer class had not concern
in it.”277
Similarly, the absence of beggars in Richmond
convinced many that starvation was not a serious problem in
the city. J.B. Jones commented, “To-day [sic] beef was selling
in market at one dollar per pound. And yet one might walk for
hours in vain, in quest of a beggar.”278 He went on to
elaborate, “Not a beggar is yet to be seen in this city of
100,000 inhabitants!”279 Judith McGuire, another Richmond
resident, concurred with Jones‟s analysis. She wrote:
I saw the Rev. Mr. Peterkin, who is perhaps more
thoroughly acquainted with the state of the poor than
any man in the city. He says that they are admirably
attended to. Large sums of money are put in the
hands of the clergy for their benefit; this money is
disbursed by ladies, whose duty and pleasure it is to
relieve the suffering. One gentleman gave as much as
$5,000 last winter. Besides this, the industrious poor
are supplied with work by the Government, and
regularly paid for it.280
McGuire failed to recognize two things. First,
although most individuals were indeed employed by the
government, their wages were not sufficient to provide the
necessary food and clothing for their families. Secondly, she,
like many of the elite, underestimated the pride of the poor.
They were not seeking charity. T.C. DeLeon conveyed his
surprise when a poor woman refused to accept his money. He
wrote,
A poor, fragile creature, still girlish and refined under
the pinched and pallid features of starvation, tottered
to me one day to beg work.
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“It is life or death for me and four young
children,” she said. “We have eaten nothing to-day;
and all last week lived on three pints of rice!”
Will Wyatt, who was near, made a generous
offer of relief. Tears sprang into the woman‟s eyes as
she answered, “You mean kindness, major; but I have
never asked charity yet. My husband is at the front;
and I only ask a right—to be allowed to work for my
children!”281
DeLeon, had difficulty understanding this reaction, but
attributed it to her dedication to the Southern cause, rather
than to pride. In a similar manner, the Bread Riot began when
women attempted to procure the right to purchase food at
reasonable prices. These individuals were not accustomed to
receiving aid and were often too proud to beg.282
This misconception carried into the printed media‟s
view of the rioters as foreigners, “Yankees,” and prostitutes.
The rhetoric of the press was decidedly biased against the
rioters. The Examiner depicted the leader of the riot, Mary
Jackson, as “a good specimen of a forty year old Amazon,
with the eye of the Devil.”283 Even the Confederate First Lady
utilized these stereotypes in her description of the incident.
Varina Davis also described Mary Jackson as “a tall, daring,
Amazonian-looking woman.”284 The term “Amazonian”
evoked notions of public women—prostitutes, not worthy of
the sympathy of the community.
In its representation of the Richmond Bread Riot, the
Examiner similarly depicted the crowd as composed solely of
“prostitutes, professional thieves, Irish and Yankee hags and
gallows birds from all lands.”285 Many of the diarists used the
same descriptions. In an attempt to deny that serious need
existed in Richmond, the elites used stereotypes to blame the
motivation on external agents. After the riot, Catherine
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Edmondston wrote, “We call them mobs for plunder & believe
that they were instigated by the Yankees. They are composed
of low foreigners, Irish, Dutch, & Yankee and in place of
wanting bread they threw Rice, flour, etc., in the street &
mobbed dry goods & shoe stores!” 286 Sallie Putnam also made
dubious claims about the composition of the mob. She wrote,
“The rioters were represented in a heterogeneous crowd of
Dutch, Irish, and free negroes—of men, women, and
children…”287 T.C. DeLeon blamed the mob on the hated
speculators and turned his description into praise for the
loyalty and dedication of the Confederate soldiers. He
recorded,
Suffice it that the human hyenas of speculation did
prey upon the dying South…that thrice they stored
the flour the people felt was theirs, in such great
quantities and for so long, that before their maw for
gain was gutted, serious riots of the starving called
for the strong hand to interfere. And to the credit of
the Government and southern soldier, be it said—
even in that dark hour, with craving stomach and
sickening soul—“Johnny Reb” obeyed his orders and
guarded the den of the hyena—from his own
hungering children, perhaps!288
These classifications allowed the upper class members of
Richmond to legitimize the riot as externally motivated.
These illustrations were extremely inaccurate.
Historian Elizabeth R. Varon is highly critical of the portrayal
of the rioters. She writes, “The response of the Confederate
authorities, press, and elite to the riot reflects a distinct lack of
empathy for the poor, a virulent sexism, and deep anxiety
about the machinations of the „secret enemies‟ of the
South.”289 Varon‟s conclusion, although harsh in her criticism,
286
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is accurate. The Richmond elite, in an attempt to deny that any
fissures existed in the Southern social system, blamed the riot
on outsiders and social outcasts.
Contrary to the descriptions provided by the elite, the
women who participated in the riot came mostly from the
local poor of Richmond. Scholars detect only one instance of a
wealthy individual‟s participation. One member, Mrs.
Margaret Adeline Pomfrey did actually possess land and
property which made her fairly wealthy. According to the
United States Census of 1860, she owned a total of 127.5 acres
and a few slaves.290 Mrs. Pomfrey, however, was an anomaly.
The majority of rioters did not own slaves or
substantial property. One protester, Martha Jamieson, testified
that over 300 women employed by Weisiger‟s clothing factory
took part in the riot.291 Indeed, many of the rioters were
starving, according to both J.B. Jones and Sara Pryor‟s friend,
Agnes.292
In terms of starvation, historian Paul D. Escott
believes that it was a real possibility in the Confederacy. He
writes, “The extent of suffering was staggering…Some idea of
the dimensions of poverty can be grasped from the fact that at
the end of the war more than a quarter of Alabama‟s white
citizens were on relief.”293 Hospital matron Phoebe Pember
believed soldiers‟ concerns about providing for their families
encouraged desertions from the army. She wrote,
Almost all of these letters told the same sad tale of
destitution of food and clothing, even shoes of the
roughest kind being too expensive for the mass or
unattainable by the expenditure of any sum, in many
parts of the country…how hard for the husband or
father to remain inactive in winter quarters, knowing
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that his wife and little ones were literally starving at
home—not even at home, for few homes were left. 294
In Richmond, as much as in the regions Escott
describes, a similar situation emerged. Even middle class
members observed the suffering. In reference to President
Davis‟s designation of March 27, 1863, as a day of fasting and
prayer, J.B. Jones despaired, “Fasting in the midst of famine!
May God save this people!”295 Even the middle classes,
previously comfortable, could not afford to provide sufficient
nourishment for their families. Jones described a common
dinner for his family. It consisted of “…twelve eggs, $1.25; a
little corn bread, some rice and potatoes. How long shall we
have even this variety and amount?”296 Richmond‟s rampant
inflation due to overcrowding, impressment, and speculation
made it impossible for an increasing number of citizens to
provide for themselves and their families. Jones relayed a
chilling narrative about his daughter‟s encounter with a
starving rat:
Some idea may be formed of the scarcity of
food in this city from the fact that, while my
youngest daughter was in the kitchen to-day,
a young rat came out of its hole and seemed
to beg for something to eat; she held out
some bread, which it ate from her hand, and
seemed grateful. Several others soon
appeared, and were as tame as kittens.
Perhaps we shall have to eat them!297
This suffering permeated throughout the middle and
lower classes of the city. Although working class women and
children from the city of Richmond composed the majority of
the mob, men also participated in the Richmond Bread Riot.
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Chesson postulates that historians have estimated the role of
men incorrectly. He writes, “The role played by men in the
bread riot may have been somewhat understated. Although the
organizers and leaders were women, the riot had masculine
support.”298 Almost every eyewitness commented that men
aided the women. Often, these men received harsher
judgments than the women involved. Margaret Brown Wight
wrote, “They were accompanied by men of the worst character
who no doubt were at the bottom of this infamous
proceeding.”299
Similarly, a few women from outside the city of
Richmond participated in the riot. Margaret Adeline Pomfrey
lived over 11.5 miles away from the city.300 Most likely, she
traveled to her home in Port Mayo (directly outside
Richmond) the night before the riot in order to take part the
next morning. Her participation in the Richmond Bread Riot
proves that word of the April 1st meeting had spread
throughout the city. Regardless of the elite observers‟ attempts
to dismiss the riot as a spontaneous, insignificant event, it was,
in actuality, a protest planned in advance as a result of general
discontent among the poorer citizens of Richmond.
Disapproval existed in the city and the women refused to
continue complying with the outrageous demands which the
government placed on its citizens.
Although the riot was deemed a “bread riot,” the
participants needed much more than just food. The price of
clothing increased in a manner comparable to all other prices
in the Confederacy. Kate Cumming, a Confederate nurse,
noted in her diary, “In the matter of dress we are pretty „hard
up,‟ and if the war lasts much longer, I for one will have
„nothing to wear.‟”301 Phoebe Pember noted that many wives
298
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applying for furloughs for their husbands cited the deficiency
of clothing and shoes on the home front. She wrote, “Almost
all of these letters told the same sad tale of destitution of food
and clothing, even shoes of the roughest kind being either too
expensive for the mass or unattainable by the expenditure of
any sum, in many parts of the country.” 302 J.B. Jones noted
that in Richmond specifically, many individuals suffered for
lack of clothing. He wrote, “We are all in rags, especially our
underclothes.”303 Although food presented a more immediate
concern, clothing was a matter of more than mere fashion in
the Confederacy.
In actuality, clothing represented the most basic sense
of social standing for women in the South. Werner Steger
cautions scholars not to underestimate the importance of
clothing in the minds of the female rioters. He writes, “On the
one hand, good and clean clothes were a symbol of
respectability for many women; on the other, women were
often socially judged solely based on their physical
appearance.”304 By April 1863, many women were clothed in
threadbare material that barely sufficed to cover their bodies.
Shoes were also an almost unheard of luxury. Thus, the
looting of clothing and shoe stores during the Richmond Bread
Riot did not constitute rampant thievery as many of the
accounts portrayed. Instead, the women seized goods which
were a necessity for their survival and for their standing as
respectable women.
The trials of many participants confirmed the
importance of clothing in Richmond society. The better
dressed and more attractive women often received more
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lenient sentences from the Richmond Hustings Court. 305 The
cases of Laura Gordon and Mary Woodward display this
tendency. Mary Woodward was described as “genteel
looking” and “pretty and handsomely dressed.” Although she
was charged with assaulting a police officer and was caught
with stolen goods including flour, soap, and bacon, she was
quickly released after her prosperous mother-in-law posted her
bail.306 Similarly, Laura Gordon was depicted as “a young
lady of some means” and “neatly dressed.” The police
discovered stolen items in her home and she was originally
sentenced to thirty days in jail. After she fainted in the court
room, however, the judge reduced her sentence to four
hours.307
By way of contrast, older women often received
harsher sentences. Chesson notes, “Middle-aged and elderly
women, even if nicely dressed and able to afford an attorney,
did not escape so lightly.”308 Two older women, Mary Johnson
and Frances Kelley, were indicted despite the fact that they
were well represented by lawyers. Johnson, a mother of two
older children, received the harshest punishment of all of the
individuals tried in court: five years in the Virginia State
Penitentiary. Kelley, a widow, was sentenced to thirty days in
jail even though she was convicted of stealing goods worth
less than twenty dollars.309 These older women received
notably harsher sentences than the young, well-dressed
305
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women. This obvious bias underscores the importance which
clothing and outward appearance held in Richmond society.
These women‟s complaints about the scarcity of
clothing represented their desire for relief and assistance. The
Confederacy‟s detached policy regarding support for the poor
created a distinct sense of abandonment. Paul Escott believes
that the Confederate government unwisely took an inactive
stance toward poverty. The elite members of the government
did not foresee the problems their legislation created. Escott
notes, “Jefferson Davis and his administration were slow to
recognize poverty as a major internal problem which
demanded their attention, and they tended to respond to it in a
piecemeal way.”310 Moreover, the government supported
private or state-run charities rather than assuming an active,
visible role. Many of the people who would have benefited
from Confederate poor relief were he families of Southern
soldiers. Proper measures for the support of families on the
home front would have decreased desertions from the
Confederate army and aided the Confederate war effort.
One factor which contributed to the inactivity of both
the government and the elite was the notion of shared
sacrifice. The rhetoric of the Richmond press was steeped with
accolades for Confederate women‟s untiring sacrifices on
behalf of their country and their soldiers. Among the upper
classes, many believed that shared suffering lessened class
distinctions. The Richmond Dispatch reported, “All classes,
because of the impossibility of procuring delicacies, have to
go without them, but the substantial of life, such as meats,
bread, and vegetables, are plentiful, and the few that cannot
purchase them readily find aid in their more fortunate
neighbors and friends.”311 The Richmond Bread Riot
illuminated the errors in this assumption. Often, the elite could
afford to arrange for goods to be delivered from country
plantations. Mary Chesnut wrote in the fall of 1863, “We had
sent us from home wine, rice, potatoes, hams, eggs, butter,
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pickles. About once a month a man came on with all that the
plantation could furnish us.”312
This disparity between the goods available to the
poor and wealthy members of society only increased as the
war progressed. Many of the upper class continued to host
elaborate parties with an abundance of meat, fruit, and cakes.
Although the elite contended they supported the war effort by
attending starvation parties (parties where no food was
served), they fed themselves in the privacy of their homes
prior to attending.313 Mary Chesnut, as well as many of the
elite in Richmond, complained about high prices, yet
continued to procure the delicacies. For example, as late as
December 1863, Mary Chesnut recorded the food provided at
dinner on Christmas Day. She wrote, “Today my dinner was
comparatively a simple affair—oysters, ham, turkey,
partridges, and good wine.”314 Chesnut and others believed in
the nobility of their monetary sacrifice in purchasing such
goods, but they failed to notice that the lower classes could not
afford to purchase items of basic necessity such as bacon,
corn, or peas.315
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Another notion which influenced the Confederate
government to take a detached stance toward relief was the
antebellum tradition of paternalism. As Drew Gilpin Faust
notes, “The farm or plantation also served as the primary site
of social and political organization.”316 The Southern elite
adhered to the notion that those who possessed the means
were responsible for caring for the less fortunate members of
society. Thus, the many small farmers or squatters on the
outskirts of plantations often looked to the plantation owners
for both advice and support. According to one scholar, George
Wythe Randolph served on in the Richmond City Council
because of “a sense of enlightened social responsibility. His
elitist sense of responsibility required him to do what he could
for society when the able-bodied men were in the field.”317 As
the war progressed, however, and the notion of universal
suffering dominated the minds of upper class Southerners,
many neglected their responsibility of assisting the poor. The
rich also felt the stresses of war and often chose to provide for
themselves and their families rather than fulfilling the
antebellum responsibility of aiding the poorer members of the
community. The poor‟s sense of abandonment only
contributed to the idea circulating among the lower classes
that the War was essentially a “rich man‟s war and a poor
man‟s fight.”
Although the poor contended that the elite had
neglected their paternalistic responsibility, Richmond actually
had a distinct tradition of poor relief in the antebellum era.
Samuel Mordecai, in his description of pre-war Richmond,
emphasized the city‟s dedication to the care of those who had
difficulty providing for themselves. He wrote, “The Amicable
Society was instituted in 1788, with the benevolent object of
relieving strangers and wayfarers, in distress, for whom the

experienced difficulty adapting its class system to the stresses
of war.
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law makes no provision.”318 He also noted the existence of
other charitable organizations, including the Male Orphan
Asylum and the Female Humane Association.319
In the patriotic afterglow of secession, however, the
wealthy lost sight of the tradition of assisting the poor. The
Richmond City Council demonstrated its lack of consideration
for the city‟s lower class citizens when, on June 5, 1861, it
resolved, “That the Committee on the Alms House be
authorized to stop the work, or any part of it, on the said Alms
House…That the said committee be authorized to allow the
use of the Alms House as a temporary hospital for sick
soldiers…”320 Thus, Richmond‟s leaders proved that their
priorities lay in supporting the Confederacy and the
Confederate Army, rather than providing security for their
own domestic poor.
Although the reaction came too late, the Richmond
Bread Riot spurred an alteration of both city and Confederate
policies regarding poor relief. The Richmond City Council
took the first measures to create a long term solution. On April
13, 1863, the council passed “An Ordinance For the Relief of
Poor Persons Not in the Poor House.” It established a free
market and provided relief in the form of “provisions or
fuel.”321 The ordinance made it explicitly clear, however, that
it would provide relief only to the deserving and “worthy
poor.” The “unworthy poor” were those individuals who had
“participated in a riot, rout, or unlawful assembly.”322 Thus,
the Council asserted the notion that riots were not the proper
forum of popular protest. The councilmen refused to accept
the legitimacy of the claims of the participants in the
Richmond Bread Riot. Their reaction, however, proved they
acknowledged that at the time of the riot, the city did not
employ sufficient relief measures for the lower classes.
318

Samuel Mordecai, Richmond in By-Gone Days; Being
Reminiscences of An Old Citizen (New York: Arno Press,
1975), 181.
319
DeCredico, “Richmond Goes To War: 1861-1865,” 30-32.
320
Manarin, ed., Richmond at War, 44.
321
Ibid., 321.
322
Ibid., 320.

132

The sense of neglect was not isolated to Richmond.
The Richmond Bread Riot coincided with numerous other
Southern food riots in places as diverse as New Orleans,
Louisiana, Dalton, Georgia, Salisbury, Greensboro, and
Durham, North Carolina, Mobile, Alabama, and Atlanta and
Savannah, Georgia.323 Historian E. Susan Barber believes that
the riots corresponded to the shortage of supplies that occurred
every winter.324 The riots that erupted in the early spring
months of 1863 may have encouraged the women of
Richmond to undertake similar action. Moreover, the
Richmond Enquirer’s favorable portrayal of the Salisbury
rioters in March 1863 may have contributed to the women‟s
initiation of the Richmond Bread Riot.325
The Confederate Congress also reacted to the Bread
Riot. Soon after, on May 1, 1863, the Confederate government
passed another exemption act that “gave Confederate officials
another means to alleviate individual cases of poverty.” 326
This act exempted individuals “in districts…deprived of white
or slave labor indispensable to the production of grain or
provisions.”327 Essentially, this change in policy allowed more
men who were necessary for the survival of their families to
remain home and continue farming. These acts did little to
reverse the damage to public morale, however. One historian
classifies this Confederate government initiative “as offering
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too little, too late.”328 The Confederacy had already lost much
of its support on the home front. The failure of the elite and
the Confederate government to provide for its needy citizens
from the beginning of the war contributed to the outbreak of
the Richmond Bread Riot. The legislative responses could not
repair the sense of abandonment the poor classes felt.
*
*
*
The Richmond Bread Riot and the other food riots
that wracked the Confederacy were visible signs of the
inability of the Southern elite and the Confederate government
to adapt to changing wartime requirements. The policies of the
government and the stresses of a wartime atmosphere created
a volatile social environment. The massive mobilization of
war took the elite‟s focus off support for the community and
toward the war effort at all costs. The poor felt neglected, and
had a difficult time providing for themselves and their
families. Confederate policies aroused dissent among the
lower classes, fuelled discontent, and spurred accusations of a
“rich man‟s war and a poor man‟s fight.” The ineptitude of the
government in dealing with financial matters contributed to
rampant inflation and speculation, which further accentuated
the disparity between the upper and lower classes. The stresses
of war added to the overcrowding in Richmond and drove
prices to even more unrealistic levels. These factors, in
combination with the brutal weather of the spring of 1863,
made an uprising of some sort almost inevitable. The riot,
then, was the result of both Confederate mismanagement and
the inaccurate elite perception of the plight of the poor.
The major consequence of the government‟s
shortcomings was the reinforcement of loyalty to the state
governments at the expense of loyalty to the Confederate
government. Escott believes that the states provided for the
welfare of its poorer citizens when they saw that the
government in Richmond failed to do so. According to Escott,
Responding to their constituents‟ needs, state leaders
attempted to shield their citizens from further
sacrifice, and when they came into conflict with
328
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Confederate programs, they raised the familiar cry of
state rights as justification. Thus, the quarrels over
state rights in 1864 were a symptom of the welfare
problem rather than an independent cause of
difficulties.329
Stephen Ambrose reached a similar conclusion. He
also believed that the refusal of the Confederate Congress to
incorporate the concerns of the common man in its legislation
undercut the war effort. According to Ambrose, “The
government had forfeited the support of the Yeomen, and
without them the South could never win.” 330 Hence, the
harmonious society on which the South had prided itself in the
antebellum era proved a mere illusion. The “aristocracy of
color” served only as an instrument to hide the fissures of
class in Southern society; the requirements of war shattered
this illusion. Drew Gilpin Faust summarizes the consequences:
“The upheavals of war created conceptual and emotional as
well as social dislocations, compelling Southerners to rethink
their most fundamental assumptions about their identities and
the logic of their places in the world.”331 The Richmond Bread
Riot was the most obvious example of this destruction of
traditional identity. It forced both women and the poor to reevaluate their role in society.
After the War‟s end, the remaining men returned to
their homes and their families; however, they found life much
different than they had left it. Their wives had been forced to
assume previously unacceptable duties in their absence.
Blacks were no longer bound in slavery. Many of the members
of the elite stood side by side with the working class in
destitution. The boundaries between class, race, and gender,
on which Southerners had previously determined their place in
society, had shifted beyond recognition. Thus, Southern
society remained forever changed and the Reconstruction
South became a world of uncertainty and doubt.
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Table 1
Relative Values of Estate of Confederate Congressmen332
Relative Value of
Estate

Total Number

Percentage

No Estate (0%)

1

.4

332

Thomas B. Alexander and Richard E. Beringer, The
Anatomy of the Confederate Congress: A Study of the
Influences of Member Characteristics on Legislative Voting
Behavior, 1861-1865 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press,
1972), 20. Alexander and Beringer compare the
congressmen‟s estates with the average estate in their home
counties. According to the authors, and as the above table
illustrates, “More than half (130, or 54 percent) of the
congressmen for whom this information has been located held
estates that were at least 600 percent of the average ownership
in their home counties.” See page 18.
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Below Average (150%)

11

4.1

Average (21200%)

35

13.1

Above Average
(201-600%)

64

24

Much Above
Average (601%+)

130

48.67

26

9.7

267

100

Unknown Estate
Category
TOTAL

Table 2
Comparison of Food Prices for Small Family
Richmond, Virginia, 1860 and 1863.333

Item
Bacon, 10 lbs.
Flour, 30 lbs.

1860
1.25
1.50

1863
10.00
3.75

333

% Increase
700
150

Barber, “Civil War Bread Riots and the Development of a
Confederate Welfare System,” 20. Barber sites the Richmond
Dispatch article from 29 January 1863 for the information in
the above table. The prices only continued to rise as the effects
of weather and impressment increased throughout the spring
of 1863. However, the Dispatch article blamed only the
speculators for the sharp increase in prices. It reported, “So
much we owe the speculators, who have staid [sic] at home to
prey upon the necessities of their fellow citizens.” It never
mentioned the government‟s responsibility for inflation.
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Sugar, 30 lbs.
Coffee, 4 lbs.
Green Tea, ½
lb.
Lard, 4 lbs.
Butter, 3 lbs.
Meal, 1 peck
Candles, 2
lbs.

.40
.50
.50

.75
20.00
8.00

88
3900
1500

.50
.75
.25
.30

4.00
5.25
1.00
2.50

700
600
300
733

Appendix I
A Factual First-Hand Observation
Letter from Hal Tutwiler to Nettie Tutwiler, April 3, 1863
We have had a dreadful riot here yesterday,
& they are keeping it up today, but they are not near
as bad today as they were yesterday. But I will begin
at the first.
Thursday morning I went to the office as
usual. A few minutes after I got in, I heard a most
tremendous cheering, went to the window to see what
was going on, but could not tell what it was about &
So we all went down into the street. When we arrived
at the scene we found that a large number of women
had broken into two or three large grocery
establishments, & were helping themselves to hams,
middlings, butter, and in fact every thing they could
find. Almost every one of them were armed. Some
had a belt on with a pistol stuck in each side, others
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had a large knife, while some were only armed with a
hatchet, axe or hammer. As fast as they got what they
wanted they walked off with it.
The men instead of trying to put a stop to
this shameful proceeding cheered them on & assisted
them all in their power. When they [the women]
found that the guards were on Cary st. they turned
around & went up on Main street and broke into
several stores. In the morning before they began they
went up to the Capitol, & Governor [John] Letcher
made them a speech, but it was like pouring oil on
fire. After that the Prest. [Jefferson Davis] made them
a speech, and while they were engaged in their
robbery the mayor of the city [Joseph Mayo] came
down to make them another. But it did no good.
I think there were fully 5000 persons on
Cary st., if not more, besides that many more on
Main and Broad. This morning they began again but
they were told that if they did not disperse they
would be fired on.
One woman knocked out a pane of glass out
of a shop window, of which the door was fastened, &
put her arm in to steal something, but the shopman
cut all four of her fingers off. I was right in the
middle of the row all the time. It was the most
horrible sight I ever saw…
Have heard how the riot ended this morning.
Gov. Letcher told them he gave the five minutes to
disperse & if they did not disperse he would have
them fired on by the city guards. They immediately
began to leave the streets & in a few minutes they
were comparatively vacant. The stores have been
closed for the last two days. 334
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Ambrose, “The Bread Riots in Richmond,” 203. This is one
of the most straightforward depictions of the riot. It contains
few editorial comments and bears a striking contrast to Sallie
Putnam‟s judgmental tone.
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Appendix II
An Upper Class Observation
Sallie Brock Putnam
Originating in Richmond in the Spring of
this year, (1863,) a most disgraceful riot, to which, in
order to conceal the real designs of the lawless mob
engaged in it, was given the name of the “bread riot.”
The rioters were represented in a
heterogeneous crowd of Dutch, Irish, and free
negroes—of men, women, and children—armed with
pistols, knives, hammers, hatchets, axes, and every
other weapon which could be made useful in their
defence, or might subserve their designs in breaking
into stores for the purpose of thieving. More
impudent and defiant robberies were never
committed, than disgraced, in the open light of day,
on a bright morning in spring, the city of Richmond.
The cry for bread with which this violence
commenced was soon subdued, and instead of

140

articles of food, the rioters directed their efforts to the
stores containing dry-goods, shoes, etc. Women were
seen bending under loads of sole-leather, or dragging
after them heavy cavalry boots, brandishing their
huge knives, and swearing, though apparently well
fed, that they were dying from starvation—yet it was
difficult to imagine how they could masticate or
digest the edibles under the weight of which they
were bending. Men carried immense loads of cotton
cloth, woolen goods, and other articles, and but few
were seen to attack the stores where flour, groceries,
and other provisions were kept.
This disgraceful mob was put to flight by the
military. Cannon were planted in the street, and the
order to disperse or be fired upon drove the rioters
from the commercial portion of the city to the Capitol
Square, where they menaced the Governor, until, by
the continued threatenings of the State Guards and
the efforts of the police in arresting the ringleaders, a
stop was put to these lawless and violent proceedings.
It cannot be denied that want of bread was at
this time too fatally true, but the sufferers for food
were not to be found in this mob of vicious men and
lawless viragoes who, inhabiting quarters of the city
where reigned riot and depravity, when followed to
their homes after this demonstration were discovered
to be well supplied with articles of food. Some of
them were the keepers of stores, to which they
purposed adding the stock stolen in their raid on
wholesale houses.
This demonstration was made use of by the
disaffected in our midst, and by our enemies abroad,
for the misrepresentation and exaggeration of our real
condition. In a little while the papers of the North
published the most startling and highly colored
accounts of the starving situation of the inhabitants of
Richmond. By the prompt preventive measures
brought into requisition this riot was effectually
silenced, and no demonstration of the kind was
afterwards made during the war.

141

The real sufferers were not of the class who
would engage in acts of violence to obtain bread, but
included the most worthy and highly cultivated of our
citizens, who, by the suspension of the ordinary
branches of business, and the extreme inflation in the
prices of provisions, were often reduced to abject
suffering; and helpless refugees, who, driven from
comfortable homes, were compelled to seek relief in
the crowded city, at the time insufficiently furnished
with the means of living for the resident population,
and altogether inadequate to the increased numbers
thrown daily into it by the progress of events. How
great their necessities must have been can be
imagined from the fact the many of our women,
reared in the utmost ease, delicacy and refinement,
were compelled to dispose of all articles of taste and
former luxury, and frequently necessary articles of
clothing, to meet the everyday demands of life.
These miseries and inconveniences were
submitted to in no fault-finding spirit; and although
the poverty of the masses increased from day, to-day
there is no doubt that the sympathies of the people
were unfalteringly with the revolution in all of its
phases. Our sufferings were severe, and the
uncomplaining temper in which they were borne was
surely no evidence that there was in the Southern
masses a disposition of craven submission, but rather
of heroic devotion to a cause which brought into
exercise the sublime power „to suffer and be strong.‟
While our enemies in their country were fattening
upon all the comforts of life, faring sumptuously
every day, clothing themselves in rich garments, and
enjoying all that could make existence desirable, they
made merry over the miseries endured by the South,
and laughed at the self-abnegation of a people who
surrendered luxuries and comforts without a murmur
for the cause of the revolution. 335
335

Putnam, Richmond During the War, 208-210. Sallie
Putnam‟s description of the Richmond Bread Riot is colorful
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Appendix III
Comparison to European Food Riots
The Richmond Bread Riot bears a striking
resemblance to the European food riots of the seventeenth,
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. However, few modern
accounts of the Richmond Bread Riot incorporate this
comparison. Michael Chesson briefly references the European
riots; however, E. Susan Barber conducts the most extensive
analysis. She seeks to understand whether the Richmond
Bread Riot follows patterns similar to the ones exhibited by
the European food riots and she concurs that the two do,
indeed, correspond in both form and motive. 336
Barber correctly concludes that the riot exhibits many
of the characteristics of the European food riots of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. One of the foremost
and critical in its incriminating language. She blames the mob
on citizens with criminal intentions rather than considering the
fact the many of the rioters may have been suffering. Many of
the diary entries and newspaper editorials also contain many
of the same stereotypes. The common theme in all of the
portrayals is the tendency of the author to deny the legitimacy
of the rioters‟ complaints. The riotous actions of the women
violated that long standing veneer of class harmony in the
South. Many of the upper class members refused to accept that
transition and justified the actions of the women by blaming it
on external agents or citizens of ill repute. They developed the
concept of the “worthy poor”: those who suffered silently and
did not engage in unconventional behavior.
336
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historians on women‟s studies in Western Europe, Louis A.
Tilly, proposes that three classifications of food riots existed
in France in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth
centuries. According to Tilly, the first type of riot, the market
riot, took place in the cities and “was usually aimed at bakers
whose prices were too high and whose loaves were too few, at
city residents who were suspected of hoarding supplies of
grain in their houses, and at government officials who failed to
act swiftly to ease a food shortage.”337 The next classification,
the entrave, occurred only in rural settings. In this form, the
rioters took the grain from wagons on their way to market.
Tilly calls the last kind of food riot, taxation populaire. In this
type, the rioters seized goods, set a fair price, and sold the
goods in order to reimburse the original seller. 338
The Bread Riot in Richmond most closely resembles
the market riot. The riot took place in an urban environment
and the women first approached the government officials who
they believed had not done enough to solve the problem of
unreasonable prices. There is also evidence that the rioters did,
in some instances, target known speculators, foreigners, and
Jews.339 The class tension which had been building in
Richmond created resentment among the poor toward the
successful merchants in the city. The less prosperous members
of society believed that these speculators and wealthy
merchants were merely profiting from the war effort and had
little cause for patriotism, loyalty, or sacrifice. The
newspapers were rich with exhortations against these
individuals. Many of the women involved in the bread riots
had at least one, and in most cases, multiple family members
involved in the war and thus, wealthy merchants and those
with no apparent ties to the Confederacy constituted the prime
targets for looting and violence.340 This targeting reveals that
the Richmond Bread Riot closely resembles the market riots
337

Louise A. Tilly, “The Food Riot as a Form of Political
Conflict in France,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 2, no.
1 (Summer 1971): 23.
338
Ibid., 23-24.
339
Chesson, “Harlots or Heroines?”, 171-172.
340
Walthall, Hidden Things Brought To Light, 24.

144

which occurred in France in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.
The riot also closely resembles the qualities of the
English crowd in the eighteenth century as described by E.P.
Thompson. He believed that:
It is possible to detect in almost every eighteenthcentury crowd action some legitimizing notion. By
the notion of legitimation I mean that the men and
women in the crowd were informed by the belief that
they were defending traditional rights or customs;
and, in general, that they were supported by the wider
consensus of the community. 341
Essentially, every community possesses a set of moral norms.
When these norms are violated, the crowd believes that
unprecedented action becomes permissible. Thompson
elaborated on this idea by defining what he calls the “moral
economy of the crowd.” He writes that a violation of societal
standards and responsibilities, “taken together, can be said to
constitute the moral economy of the poor. An outrage to these
moral assumptions, quite as much as actual deprivation, was
the usual occasion for direct action.”342 In the case of the
Richmond Bread Riot, the legitimizing notion was the belief
that every individual deserved the opportunity to purchase
necessary items at a reasonable price. Thus, the rioters exactly
resembled Thompson‟s descriptions of the rioters in the
English crowds.
Another similarity between the European riots and
the Richmond Bread Riot was the existence of political
motives. Both George F. E. Rudé and Louise Tilly believe in
the close correlation of political undercurrents and food riots.
Tilly states, “The emergence of the food riot marked the
nationalization and politicization of the problem of
subsistence, and was based on a popular model of how the
341
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economy should work.”343 The first connection between
motives of hunger and political change surfaced during the
French Revolution. Public animosity rose first over the price
of bread in April, 1789. However, this unrest evolved into
political upheaval.344 The trend did not cease with the end of
the Revolution. Rudé wrote, “there are political, „patriotic,‟
and antiroyalist undercurrents and accompaniments
(particularly in the riots of November 1792) …In Paris, too the
grocery riots of 1793, at least, had political undertones.”345
These political motives also surfaced in the
Richmond Bread Riot. The women desired the availability of
reasonably priced food at government prices. They abhorred
the legislation that legalized impressment and the Tax-inKind. They first desired to bargain with the Governor, but
when he took no direct action, the women took what the
government refused to provide them. The rioters took direct
action toward remedying the problem of affordable goods.
The Richmond Bread Riot bears a striking
resemblance to the European food riots in both form and
motive. Although the women of Richmond may not have
known about the utilization of the food riot in Europe, they
undertook the same method in order to achieve change. Thus,
the food riot was an effective mode of protest in both America
and Europe.
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